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PREFACE
On October 17, 1926, a young Irish�Catholic priest stood before
the altar of his church in Royal Oak, Michigan and delivered a radio
sermon. Within a decade, his voice, transmitted by thousands of
radios, would be familiar to millions of Americans. Father Charles E.
Coughlin had begun a stormy career that would earn him the title
"radio priest" and make him one of the most controversial figures to
appear on the American political scene in the depression-ridden l930's.
The effects of the Great Depression of l929 on American society
affected the priest deeply. The "Hoovervillea," breadlines and apple
sellers so evident in Detroit caused him to include political and
economic material in his previously all-religious broadcasts. As
the depression worsened, Coughlin criticized the relief measures of
the Hoover administration and presented his own solution gleaned from
the social encyclicals of Popes Leo XIII and Pius XI. In the 1 932
presidential campaign, the radio orator supported the candidacy of
Franklin D. Roosevelt.
After Roosevelt's election, Coughlin endeavored to influence the
policies of the new president. Although Roosevelt refused to imple
ment his suggested reforms, he continued to support the New Deal for
two years. By March,

1 935,

however, the priest had become discouraged
1

by the essentially conservative nature of Roosevelt's reforms and
1

William E. Leuchtenbu.rg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal
(New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. xii, Basil Rauch, The History of
The New Deal (New York: Capricorn Books Ed., 1963), p. xiii.

grew increasingly critical of the �sident. :By the end of the year,
he was 'in open rebellion.
The rebellion of 1935 culminated in the formation of the Union
�arty whose members endeavored to defeat Roosevelt's bid for a second
ten..

The failure of the party to achieve its goal caused Father

Coughlin to radically alter the direction of his career.
In this study, I trace the de�elopment of Coughlin's disillusion
ment with the Roosevelt adminietration, analyze his contribution to
the formation of the Union Party and his role in the 1936 political
campaign, explain the reasons for the failure, and assess its effect
on Coughlin's subsequent actions.
In preparing this study, I have benefitted from the help of a
great many individuals and 1 am happy to acknowledge the many kind
nesses they have shown me.

The staffs of Waldo Library, Western

Michigan University, Mandell Library, Kalamazoo College, Nazareth
College Library and the Michigan Historical Collection, University of
Michigan Library provided me with essential material and met my every
request with patience and consideration.

�rofessor Graham Hawks of

Western }lichigan University Department of J:iistory read the manuscript
in its entirety and without his perceptive criticisms and suggestions
it would never have reached completion.

�ly

wife, Barbara Clark Parsons,

cannot be thanked by mere words. Her unfai.ling good humor, intelligent
criticism and skillful typing made the project possible.

Whatever

errors of fact or interpretation remain, however, are solely my
responsibility.

l

I
Charles Edward Coughlin was born in Hamilton, Ontario on October
25,

81 91. Although born and raised in Canada, he was an American

citizen. His father, a native of Indiana, did not relinquish hie
citizenship when he moved to Ontario. His mother, .a Canadian, was
naturalized a:f'ter her marriage. He attended parochial elementary
school in Hamilton. Then, at the age of twelve, went to Toronto to
study with the Basilian priests at St. l'1ichael's College. He remained
th ro for thirteen years, completing secondary school, college and
seminary training.
Basilian Order.

1

On June 29, 1916, he was ordained a member of the

Coughlin'a intellectual interests a.s a student proved important
in his development as a radio orator. He excelled in literature,
philosophy and public speaking. Classmates and teachers recalled
his ability to quote long Shakespearean passages and his natural
flair for drama.
The new priest spent seven years teaching English, Greek and
History at Assumption College, Sandwich, Ontario. Along with his
pedagogic duties, Coughlin also directed the "little theatre" group
2
and coached football. Had the Catholic hierarchy not decided to
revise the structure of Canon Law in late 1917, he might have spent
his life as an obscure teacher.

lRuth Mugglebee, :V'ather Cou · in of
Flower (Boston: L.C. Page and Company,
�ouis B. Ward, Father Charles E. C
Biography (Detroit; Tower Publications,

the Shrine of the Little
1933, P• 93.
u lin: An Authorized
Inc., 1933, p. 51 .

The Basilian Order was originally established as a "pious society",
an organization which combined the features of both religious and
secular orders. Under the new code of Canon Law of 1918, all such
societies were required to disband and the members allowed to join
a religious order or to remain secular priests. Father Coughlin
chose the latter and was formally incardiated in�o the Diocese of

Detroit by its bishop, Michael J. Gallagher, on February 26, 1923.3
Coughlin served at several parishes during his first three years
in the diocese. He assisted at St. Agnes' and St. Leo's in Detroit,
Sts. Peter and Paul's in North Branch, and St. Augustine's in Kalama
zoo,

His reputation as a pulpit orator 6rew quite rapidly. Regularly,

parishioners phoned the rectory of his assigned parish to inquire at

which Hass he was going to preach.4 This talent helped bring him to
the attention of Bishop Gallagher.
Father Coughlin received his assignment to Royal Oak in�. 1926.
The Bishop, after attending the canonization of St. Therese of the
Little Flower of Jesus, wanted to erect a shrine in her honor. The
burgeoning population of Detroit, overflowing into the suburbs, made
a new parish necessary. The Bishop established the new parish, the

Shrine of the Little Flower of Jesus, with Father Coughlin as pastor.5
Conditions in Royal Oak were not conducive to easy success. The
diocese advanced $79,000 to finance the construction of the new

3Ibid., p. 16.
4charles J. Tull, Father Coughlin and the New Deal (Syracuse:
Syracuse University Press, 1965), p. 2.
5ward, op. cit., pp. 17-23.

church, a sum that had to be repaid. The tense conditions in the
neighborhood, caused by friction between Catholics and fundamentalist,
Bible Belt Protestants from the Southern and Border states, retarded
growth. The Ku Klux Klan evidenced its active hostility by burning a.
cross on the church lawn.
In September, 1926, Father Coughlin, through a mutual friend, met
Leo J. Fitzpatrick, station manager of WJR, Detroit. During their
conversation, he explained the problems that he faced. Fitzpatrick
thought that the story of the young priest struggling to build a
suburban parish while combating heavy indebtedness and intolerance
might make an effective radio broadcast. The two men negotiated an
agreement in which station WJR agreed to provide free air time while
Coughlin paid the cost of the telephone lines used to carry his voice
6
from the Shrine to the studio, which came to $58 a week. Fitzpatrick
scheduled the first broadcast for the third Sundey- in October, 1926.
Coughlin made his first radio sermon dressed in his vestments and
spoke directly from the altar of the Shrine. He denounced religious
bigotry and contrasted the pious message of St. Therese with the bigoted
doctrine of the Klan.� The initial effort was surprisingly successful.
WJR received enthusiastic letters not only from the Detroit area but
also from states throughout the Midwest. Fitzpatrick and his
associates decided to carry Coughlin as a regular Sunday afternoon
feature.
The priest entitled his weekly program the "Golden Hour of the
6
Nu.gglebee, op. cit., pp. 161-71.
7Ibid.

4
Little Flower" and directed it primarily toward children. Seldom
during the first years did comments on political and economic affairs
appear in the discourses.
Before progressing further, it is perhaps well to analyze the
basis of Coughlin's radio popularity. Most observers credit his
appeal to his beautiful baritone voice and the ease, enthusiastic
sincerity and comforting tone of absolute self-confidence with which
he spoke. One critic has described it as:
A voice of such mellow richness, such manly, heartwarming,
confidential intimacy, such emotional and ingratiating
charm, that anyone tuning past it almost automatically
returns to hear it again. It is without doubt one of the
great speaking voices of the twentieth century. Warmed
by the touch of Irish brogue, it lingered over words and
enriched their emotional content. It was a voice made
for promises. 8
Furthennore, Coughlin was a master of alliteration and of vivid
imag.ezy.

He combined the fonnal eloquence of pulpit oratory with

slashing colloquialisms. As the depression worsened and its victims
grew increasingly insecure and fearful, Father Coughlin became the
focal point for their hopes and dreams_.
The success of Coughlin's radio hour steadily increased.

In

the fall of 1929, two new stations, WMAQ, Chicago and WLW, Cincin
nati, joined WJR in broadcasting his speeches. By 1930, the program
had become so popular that Coughlin spoke over the basis network of
9
the Columbia Broadcasting System.
The economic collapse of 1929 and the ensuing depression
8
wa11ace Stegner, "The Radio Priest and His Flock", The Aspirin
Age 1919-1941, ed. Isabel Leighton (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1963), P• 234.
9
ward, op. cit., PP• 28-29.

5
profoundly affected the priest so that he radically altered his radio
policies.

Coughlin made his first serious departure from strictly

religious material on January 6, 1930. He spoke on the menace of
communism in .America • .tie launched an all-out assault on the evils
of Bolshevism, and particularly stressed the degradation of family
life within Russia. The response which the broadcast elicited shocked
Coughlin. He was deluged with letters criticizing his attack on
.
10
Russian
.
Communism.
The negative response convinced Coughlin that far too many
.Americans were oblivious to the communist menace. To arouse their
awareness, he devoted the remaining broadcasts of the 1929-1�30
season to a hard-hitting denouncement of communism. While criticizing
the intellectual basis and suppositions of Marxist-Leninism, the·
priest also endeavored to reform .American society. He demanded that
.American capitalists eliminate communism's appeal by providing a
decent standard of living for their workers. The response to his
extended denunciation was, on the whole, favorable. Coughlin then
turned his attention to the increasing severity of the depression.
He began a series of criticisms of the Federal government for its
failure to relieve the people's suffering.
By the late fall of 1930, the United States had been involv�d
in the depression for nearly a year.

Conditions continued to deterio

rate with no relief in sight. The Royal 0.ik pastor entered the battle
l

Oibid., pp. 65-71.

6
offering the principles of social justice, set forth by Leo XIII in
his encyclical Rerum Novarum, as a solution. His indictment of
unregulated capitalism, the international bankers, and the theory of
rugged individualism made him a champion of the downtrodden.
Throughout 1931, Coughlin urged the reform of the capitalistic
system.

His attempts to alleviate the lot of the suffering masses

brought him into conflict with those whose conservative economic
and social beliefs caused them to resist his proposed reforms. His
desire to see the government protect the rights of the workers and
promulgate programs to relieve the depression made it inevitable
that he would soon attack the relief policies of President Hoover.
Beginning as a religious orator who "avoid (eaJ prejudical
11
subjects, all controversy and especially all bigotry",
Father
Coughlin had, by 1932, progressed to the front ranks of those
demanding a solution to the depression.

Within the next year, he

would become one of the moat vitriolic critics of the Hoover admin
istration and an active proponent of

a young Democratic politician

named Franklin D. Roosevelt.

11
An interview in The Detroit Free Press, January.17, 1927
quoted in \iilliam V. Sluw.non, The American Irish (New York: The
MacMillan Co. 1963), p. 299.

7
II

During the latter part of 1931, Father Coughlin entered the main
stream of American political protest with his denouncement of Herbert
Hoover's failure to alleviate the depression. As the weeks passed,
he became increasingly disgusted with the President's half-hearted
efforts.

As

the radio speeches demonstrate, his.criticism grew

increasingly more caustic.
Three of the major administration programs to which Coughlin
objected were the local theory of relief, the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation and the Federal Farm Loan Bank. On November 30, he
scornfully rejected President Hoover's argument that relief was a
local issue.

He pointed out the inability of the local agencies to

handle the increased number of applicants and questioned the rationale
of a government that would lend millions to foreign nations yet
l
allow its people to starve.
In early January, 1932, Coughlin attacked the proposed Recon
struction Finance Corporation. He called it a two billion dollar dole
extended to banks, to industries and to capital in general. He
further criticized, as financial socialism, the attempt to restore
the prosperity of 1928 and 1929 by a "trickle down" theory of relief.
It was the priest's fear that such action would give unlimited power
and money to a few individuals and thereby increase the severity of
.
2
t,.ne depression.

1

Charles E. Coughlin, Father Coughlin's Radio Discourses 1931-

.J.m (Royal Oak, Michigan: The Radio League of the Little Flower, 1932),
pp. 127-29.
2

Ibid., .pp. 148-50.

8

The Federal Farm Loan Bank came under fire for its high for
closure rate. Coughlin accused the institution of seizing 451 farm
properties daily. He labeled the bank "an agent of torture and
destruction and confiscation." He was especially critical of Hoover's
proposed remedies for the farm problem. In his attack upon the bank,
Coughlin also discounted the Agricultural Marketing Act as having
wasted two billion dollars without lessening farm misery.3

Coughlin's continued opposition produced an important increase
in the response of his audience. He estimated that he received over
one million letters favoring his position. This overwhelming flood
of correspondence reinforced the priest's conviction that he
represented the distressed masses.4

The handling of the issue of a soldiem' bonus completed
Coughlin's disillusionment with the Hoover administration. Through
out the spring of 1932, the priest agitated strongly for the passage
of the controversial Soldiers' Bonus Bill. He considered it doubly
valuable first, for the aid it would provide to the veterans and
their families and second, as a feasible method of devaluating the
dollar and taking the nation off the gold standard. He appeared
before the House Weys and Means Committee on April 12, and outlined
5
his views, with little avail.
When the bonus march began in June, Coughlin favored it. He
made a personal contribution of five thousand dollars to help alleviate
3Ibid., pp. 150-53.
4'l'ull, op, cit., p. 12.
5Ibid.

9
the veterans' suffering. Hoover's tactless and brutal handling of the
marchers enraged Coughlin. He spoke out bitterly against the
6
administration and promised retribution in November.
In the spring of 1932, Father Coughlin had climbed aboard the
Roosevelt bandwagon. The priest, accompanied by Detroit Mayor
Frank Murphy, visited Roosevelt in New York City and presumably
established an alliance.

The Hoosevelt Papers contain a series of

telegrams which trace the development of the association. On July 2,
Coughlin sent Roosevelt a message of congratulations on winning the
Democratic presidential nomination. He said in part "Sincere con
gratulations on your speech.

I am with you to the end. Say the

word and I will follow." They met again at Albany in August and,
although there is no record of the conversation, relations appear
to have been amicable.7

The priest also came to an agreement with Roosevelt on the
Ji.Jimly Walker case. The ebullient �or of New York was under
investigation for various fraudulent activities.

Coughlin championed

his cause, pronouncing the charges against him communist inspired
and a Republican plot. He wrote to Roosevelt several times request
-;ing that he interc,.ede on Walker's behalf. Roosevelt, not desiring
to lose the priest's support in the campaign, responded that" I
am, as you know, giving the defense every latitude and I am being
scrupulously careful not to· make up my mind in ... any way until the
6

New York Times, August 10, 1932.
7Tu11, op, cit., P• 15.

lO
case is wholly in."

8

This satisfied Coughlin.

The 1932 CiWlpaign gave Coughlin a chance to exercise his
latent power. The priest continued his blistering attack upon the
Hoover adroiniRtration. Although never specifically endorsing the
Democratic candid.ate, Coughlin made it eminently clear where his
sentiments l�. He scored the President for his failure to solve the
economic problems of the depression and advocated devaluation of the
dollar as an essential step in the recovery proces�. l,ilien the results
of the 1932 election were in, the priest considered himself in a
great part responsible for the Roosevelt victory.9

Coughlin's influence in the election should not be minimi�ed.
The grave condition of the nation when he began his broadcasting
career gave an impact to his message. People demanded to know who was
responsible for the collapse and Coughlin, with his magnifi�ent voice
and persuasive manner, conveniently supplied a scapegoat in the
"international bankers" and the communists. Furthermore, his clerical
vocation lent weight to his argument. The people felt they could
trust his pronouncements because he was a priest dedicated to social
justice, not a politician seeking votes.
Coughlin must be considered sincere in his motivation. He was
deeply affected by the suffering visible throughout the country. His
home area, Detroit, was especially devastated; all he had to do was
observe the desperate plight of the thousands of unemployed in the
8

1214•, P• 17 •
9
lB!!!·, p. 22.

ll

midst of abundant food and consumer goods to become aroused over the
government failure. His remedies were strictly in keeping vi.th the
l
social teachings of the Church. o
The number of votes that the radio priest delivered to Roosevelt
will never be known. The important point was his feeling that he was
in part responsible for the victory. He considered himself an
unofficial member of the New Deal admjnistration and undoubtedly
expected to exercise considerable influence on

. ,_ adrojnistration

policies.
Roosevelt's position in regard to Coughlin is an interesting one.
The President was happy to have the priest's support but apparently
did not return Coughlin's personal admiration. Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt
made the statement that her husband "disliked and distrusted" the

priest from the beginning. 11 Rexford G. Tugwell, an early "braintruster",
recalled a statement made to him by Roosevelt concerning such figures
as Coughlin, Huey Long and Dr. Townsend. He said "We must tame
2
these fellows and make them useful to us." 1 The new Administration
begm with Father Coughlin, due to his high regard for Rooseve�t,
actively supporting the New Deal program. Before it waa over, Coughlin
would be its most violent critic.
Coughlin and the new president co-operated closely during the
first hundred deys of the new Administration. The priest attended the
l
Oibid., P• 21.
11Ibid., P• 22.
12ite:xford G. Tugwell, The Democratic Roosevelt (New York: Garden
City Publishers, 1957), p. ·350.

12
inauguration and, later in the month, returned to Washington for a
personal visit with Roosevelt. The New York Times reported that the
President asked him to continue his support in the farm areas. He

l
acquiesced on the condition that some fonn of inflation be initiated. }
Cough.J.in's reaction to the Detroit banking crisis mirrored
his continuing belief that he was an unofficial member of the

Roosevelt team. In March, 1933, the Union Guardian Trust Compaey
collapsed and threatened to involve the still solvent Detroit banks in
its failure. ln his broadcasts, the priest alleged that the Detroit
bankers had granted themselves fraudulent loans to repay the losses
they had sustained in the 1929 stock market crash. For this reason,
Cough.J.in opposed the use of Reconstruction Finance Corporation funds
to aid the Detroit banks. Secretary of the Treasury William Woodin,
cognizant of the� attacks on the Detroit banking community,
appointed federal officials to take charge of the resources of both
the Guardian National Bank of Commerce and the First National Bank
of Detroit.14

On March 26, the priest, acting without authorization as a
spokesman for the government, launched a savage attack against the
Detroit bankers. He charged that they had organized a special holding
compliU:zy, the Detroit Bankers Company, to avoid liability as bank
stockholders. E.D.Stair, a member of the governing board of the
Detroit Bankers Committee and publisher of the Detroit Free Press, was
13New York Times, March 23, 1933.
14
Tu11, op. cit., P• 24.

singled out for special criticism. Coughlin also charged that,
on the basis of inside information, sixty-three million do.J.lars had
been secretly withdrawn from the First National Bank just prior to
the famous "bank holiday" of March 9, 1933. Finally, he asserted
that the First National was only twelve and one half per cent liquid

on Februa.ry.ll, rather than the eighty per cent which it claimed.15
Tne reaction to Coughlin's outburst was rapid and wide-spread.

Most incensed was E.D.Stair of the Detroit Free Press who threatened
to sue the priest for slanden..

An editorial in the Free Press

entitled "Coughlin the Demagogue" accused the priest of destroying the
people's confidence in the Detroit banks.

The author defended his

publisher by insisting that he served on the banks' �ard of governors
out of a sense of "civic duty," receiving no salary. Furthermore, the
editorial contended that the Diocese of Detroit was the largest
single debtor of the First National Bank and the Church's inability to
make its p�ents was one of the main reasons for the bank's predicament.
The editorial included a personal attack against Coughlin which mirrored
the editor's feeling toward the Royal Oak Pastor. It concluded,
"How long will thisecclesiaatical Huey Long be allowed to slander
decent citizens of this city in the name of God?"

16

The most important question em.inating from the conflict was
whether Coughlin spoke with any sanction from the Roosevelt admin
istration.

The Roosevelt Papers contain several documents pertinent

15
ward, op, cit., PP• 179-90.
16
Ibid., PP• 191-93.

14
to the issue. On l'-Iarch 23, a memoranq.um written by Marvin Hacintyre,
presidential appointments secretary, stated that Coughlin called to
sizy that if the President wanted him to go on the air and explain the
Administration's newest hanking measures he would be ·glad to do so.
Maclntyret:Z.ansferred the information to Secretary Woodin who was
1
contacted by the priest. 7 What then transpired is unknown,. but it
is quite apparent that after the call, Coughlin considered himself
authorized to speak for the Administration.
Father Coughlin definitely had some official sanction for his
broadcast. Mayor Frank Murphy of Detroit had appointed him a
member of the Detroit Depositor's Committee.

Whether he spoke at the

request of either MacIntyre or Secretary Woodin, however, is another
matter. What Woodin said to the priest remains unknown. On March 27,
1933, !'1acintyre sent a memorandum to Louis M. Howe,' special political
adviser to the President. In it, he gave his analysis of the
situation:
Confidentially, I think the Reverend Father took
considerable liberties with the facts and most certainly
misquoted me and misstated the case in seying that the
request for him to go on the radio and to answer the
Commissioner came from the administration. 18
Whether or not Coughlin actually spoke for the Administration,
the public considered his action out of order. A considerable volume
of mail descended upon the Pre.sident criticizing this use of a cleric.
The trend of the letters seemed to demand that Roosevelt issue a

17Tull, op. cit., pp.
24-25.

18

Ibid., p. 26.

15

statement that·the priest spoke only for himself.

At the time,

nothing elucidating the issue was forthcoming.
The conflict between Father Coughlin and the Detroit bankers
resumed during the late summer of 1933.

The priest appeared as a

witness before a one man Grand Jury investigating the conditions
of the Detroit banking system.

Testifying before Judge Harry B.

Keiden on August 24, he charged that both the Union Guardian Trust
Company and the First National Bank were wrecked by the philosopey
that "money in the hands of the masses is a menace." Continuing
his testimony, �oughlin denounced Herbert Hoover as "attempting to
cure this damnable depression by pouring gold in at the top while
the people starved at the bottom." In contrast, he praised Roosevelt
as"• • • a president who thiDks right, who lives for the common
man, who knows patience and suffering, who knows that men come
before bonds and that human rights are mor� sacred than financial
n'ghts."

19

The Detroit Free Press again attempted to .humble the radio priest
by charging that he had purchasai sixty shares of stock in Kelsey
�es Wheel, a company involved in financial chicanery.

Unconcerned

by this latest attack, Coughlin accused the paper and its editor of
forging his signature on·the stock, although ·he admitted that his
20
Radio League of the Little Flower
had purchased it. He then told
19

New York Times, August 24-25, 1933.
20The Radio League was founded in 1927 to help defray the heavy
cost of broad.casting. Composed of members from all faiths who
contributed one dollar a year, it later became an important source
of funds for the National Union for Social Justice.

16
reporters that there would be federal indictments issued against
E.D. Stair and other Detroit financiers.

Special Assistant Attorney
21
General Johns. Pratt immediately denied this statement.
Throughout the summer, Coughlin had. been writing to various figures
in the Administration endeavoring to instigate a thorough investigation
of banking in Detroit. His letters to such figures as Jesse Jones,
chairman of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, William Julian,
2

United States Treasurer and MacIntyre received no replie�� The failure
of.the Administration to acknowJedge this correspondence points to
an obvious conclusion,

Having been caught once, the �resident was

trying to avoid en:y further controversy over who was empowered to act
as a spokesman.
Whether Coughlin actually represented the Roosevelt admini�tration
in the Detroit banking issue or assumed unauthorized powers still
remains an enigma. However, if he acted in no official CB.i)&city,
it seems strange that the �resident issued no official denials.Nost
Coughlin scholars agree that the priest was, in some nebulous capacity,
being used by the Administration. When events took an awkward turn,
it became politically convenient for Roosevelt to deny any connection
with the priest's action.
The incident takes on added importance when viewed as the
beginning of the decline of amicable Coughlin-Roosevelt relations.
The priest had taken a stand favoring the controversial governmental
policy of bank investigation and when sternly challenged had received
�ew York Times, .August 25-26, 1933.
22Tull,
op, cit., P• 3le

17
no support from the President. The honeymoon was rapidly ending.
The priest's radio broadcasts became increasingly more economic
in orientation. Father Coughlin sincerely believed that the major
problem confronting the United States in the early 1930 1 s was a
monetary one. He devoted the majority of his 1933-1934 discourses to
indicting the evil inachinations of the "international bankers",
demanding the re.:.evaluation of the gold ounce to its legal maximum,
and ending the "money famine." The primacy of economic issues continued
throughout Coughlin's radio career and became a major factor in his
break with Roosevelt.·
Coughlin's chief reason for attacking international bankers
was his feeling that they had greedily wrecked economic havoc for
the sake of personal gain. He believed re-evaluation of the gold
ounce would ·be a major step in ending the depression. lie stated,
"My friends, the fundamental cause of this depression is the stupidity
of trying to retain the 1900 valuation of our gold ounce in a ratio
of 12-1 in the face of the fact that this gold, as related to currency
money.and to.outstanding credit money has been rendered absolutely
23
impractical."
Coughlin claimed that the real credit dollar-gold
dollar ratio had expanded to the lopsided proportion of 117-1.

His

plan to increase the price of gold from its J20.67 per ounce rate to
$41.34, the legal ceiling, would have greatly increased the amount of
money in circulation and also r�duced the national debt by one half. The
priest made it clear that he regarded gold as a medium of exchange, not
23
Ibid., P• 32.

18
as real wealth.24-The money famine, according to Coughlin, had been
deliberately created by the bankers to increase their own profits.
He demanded that some form of controlled inflation be enacted to put
the dollar back in circulation at its true value.
Other theories which Coughlin advanced complem,ented his basic
program.

He demanded the nationalization of all gold, with the

government reimbursing the holders with paper currency. He advocated
the recall of all "non-productive" bonds, such as World War I Liberty
bonds, which he dubbed "slavery bonds", again suggesting that the
2
bearers be repaid with paper currency. 5 The purpose of all of his
schemes was to achieve inflation by the issuance of paper currency.
Although Father Coughlin's economic reform.theories were more·
radical than those held by President Roosevelt, the priest continued
his loyal support of the .l'.:resident. He appeared confident that the
Administration would accept his currency reform theories and advised
his radio audience to be patient and give Roosevelt a chance to work
things out. The priest went so far as to defend the unpopular Econo1113
Bill of March 11, which reduced veterans' pensions and federal salaries.
The {>,resident, the priest maintained, was endeavoring to put the
nation back to work; a far more important task than putting people on
26
doles.
An indication of Coughlin's political influence was a joint
�enate-Houae request sent to the J;'resident asking that he be appointed
as an economic ad.visor to the London Conference. Six senators and

24Cbarles E. Coughlin, MoneYl Questions and Answers (Royal Oak,
Michigan, The National Union for Social Justice, 1936), PP• 28-34.

25Ibid.,

PP• 60-62.

26Tull, o
p,

cit.,
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fifty-nine congressmen signed it. According to these lawmakers,
Father Coughlin had "the confidence of millions of Americans." The
signing senators were: Edward Thomas of Colorado, "Cotton" Ed Smith
of So�h Carolina, Huey P. Long of Louisiana, Thomas D. Schall and
Henrik Shipsted of Minnesota and William Gibbs MacAdoo of California.
The Htouse petition was signed by fifty-three Democrats and six
Republicans. Twenty-eight were from the Midwest, sixteen from the
Southern or Border states while the remaining twelve were widely
scattered. Only two Eastern congressmen, Emanuel Caller of New York

and Arthur Healy of Mtissachusetts, signed.27 Professor James Shenton
of Columbia Vniverdty pointa out, 1n hiu analyai1 of Coughlin,
that the heterogeneous backgrounds of the signers suggest "how real
was the possibility that Coughlin might bridge the gap between the
rural fundamentalist Protestants and the urban Irish Catholics whose
28
The
antagonisms had disrupted the Democratic Party in 1924".
possibility that Coughlin might be a threat to Roosevelt in 1936
was apparent as early as June of 1933.
Roosevelt did not heed the congressional petition and handled
the London Economic Conference without the priest's aid. Although the
_:\'.resident's actions concerning the conference have been widely
criticized, the priest praised his message to the conference which
asserted the need for independent national currencies, calling it a

27Ibid •.
28
James P. Shenton, "The Coughlin Movement and the Nev Deal"
Political Science Q.uarterlY LXXIII (September, 1958), P• 354.
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"bomb shell." Co�in had been thrilled by Roosevelt's refusal to
involve the American dollar Yith foreign currency at London. He
continued to advocate support for Roosevelt as the answer to the
depression.
The economic conditions within the nation created great pressure
upon the Roosevelt adro1nj�tration to experiment l(ith.some form of
inflation. The:f�esident compromised with the.legislature and aooepted
th(. Thomas .Amendment;, to the Agricultural Adjustment Act.

This

provision gave the Ohief Executive the power to instigate any or all

of the following measures: the coinage of silver at the ratio of
16 to l, the issuance of paper currency, or the adjuatment of the gold
content of the dollar. The bill was a strategic retreat forced upon
Roosevelt by the apparently irresistible congressional. sentiment for
inflation. He only accepted it as an attempt to retain as much
29
control as possible over monetary manipulation.
The fresident's cautious implementation of the measure disturbed
the inflationists, including Coughlin.

In a wire sent to the Piresident

on July 21, 1933, the priest analyzed the situation by

saying:

••• there has been but a psychological revaluation. Our
difficulties cannot be solved until there is a real revaluation. In other words, there must be an issue of
federal greenbacks. Actually, there are fewer doll� in
circulation tod.q than there were a month previous.
The economic issue was fast becoming a point of contention between
the two individuals. When the break came, it would pley a primary part.

29Arthur
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Although Coughlin remained loyal to the President throughout
1933, he grew increasingly opposed to two major adminietration
programs. The National. Recovery Administration and the Agricultural
Adjustment Administration left the priest less than enthusiastic.
He saw no solution in the N.R.A. for the sagging commodity prices
that plagued the nation. Also, he was critical Qf the low wage
scales paid by many companies under the N.R.A. codes. He advocated
immediate inflation to prevent it from becoming a "colossal. failure."
He reported to the President that his listeners "from every quarter
and section of the continent" had written him concerning New Deal
relief measures. He continued that "The vast majority ••• have not
31
much faith in the National Recovery Act".
Father Coughlin was even more opposed to the A.A.A. theory of
crop reduction and destruction to raise farm prices. He was more
sympathetic to the plight of millions of hungry citizens. Writing
to Roosevelt in late September, the priest revealed his feelings
toward Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wal.lace _and Rexford Tugwell,
the chief architects of the plan. He accused the two men of "fouling
the countryside and the Mississippi River with their malodorous
rottenness." He heatedly informed Roosevelt that "there is no
superfluity of either cotton or wheat until every naked back has been
clothed, until every empty stomach has been filled." He advanced the
old Populist plank of unlimited silver coinage.as the obvious solution
I

31 Ibid.,

P• 39.

,

to the problem.

32

Up to this time, the priest had maintained a facade of public
support for the New Deal. Whatever disagreement he harbored, he
aired only in private correspondence to the ;f'Jresident and other
adminietration officials. The nature of his radio broad.caste
subtly changed with the start of the new season in October, 1933.
While he scrupulously refrained from direct criticism of the P•resident,
he openly indicted les:eer members of the Admjnistration and those
Nev Deal theories which he opposed. The da_ys of complete agreement
with Roosevelt were at an end. Coughlin drew avq from the New Deal.

32

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Politics of Upheaval �Boston:
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III

As the priest's letters became increasingly critical, Roosevelt
grew interested in an accurate estimate of the support which Coughlin
possessed. The priest was immensely proud of the volume of mail he
was receiviDg and spoke of it often. To ascertain whether Coughlin's
estimates were accurate, the fresident ordered the �ost Office
Department to undertake an investigation of his claims. In a tw nty
month stuey, stretching from July, 1933 to February, 1935, the Royal

1
Oak Post Office reported cashiDg 65,397 money orders worth $404,145.
_ It was growing increasingly clear that the priest would be a formidable
opponent if he placed himself in complete opposition to the Nev Deal.
The issue of silver coinage had become Cougblin's primary theme
during the 193�1934 broadcasting season. He did not believe that
the f,resident had done enough to increase the flow of money into the
economy and considered the free coinage of silver as the most effective
means to solve the money famine. His arguments in favor of silver as
currency faithfully mirrored the standard Populist arguments. He
felt it would: place more money in circulation, cause a rise in
prices, and expand .American foreign trade with such silver-using
2
nations as China and Japan. These ideas echoed the demands of the
highly vocal "silver bloc" in Congress led by Senators Edvard Thomas
of Oklahoma, Key Pittman of Nevada, and Burton Wheeler of Montana.
\ihile promoting the cause bf silver inflation, Coughlin, somewhat

�. PP• cit., P• 41.
2Ibid.
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illogically, continued his defense of the government monetary policy.
On November 3, 1933, the priest unequivocally predicted that the
President would remonetize silver in the near future. He was sure
that the President "bas not forgotten his public vow which pledged
him to a sound and adequate money." The priest then uttered what was
to become his most famous statement "It is either Roosevelt or ruin." J
The controversial nature of Coughlin's broadcasts continued. In
late November, the priest· criticized Alfred E. Smith, former Democratic
presidential candidate, for his opposition to Roosevelt's financial
policies. In a slashing personal attack, Coughlin accused Smith of
being a "paid stooge" of the large banking interests. Smith replied
in kind; and the effect of the feud between the country's most
prominent Catholic priest and its most prominent Catholic 1�
was disheartening. The Catholic hierarchy and press divided on the
.issue. Coughlin's willingness to descend to personal invective
against a fellow Catholic weakened his support among Church members.
The A.l.dministration, witnessing the bitterness of his speech, reaffirmed
its wariness of his emotionalism and vitriolic tongue.
In early 1934, Coughlin attacked the government for its failure
to enact monetary legislation. His new whipping boy was the Federal
Reserve System. He criticized it for retaining the recently nation
alized gold rather than depositing it with the Treasury Department.
The priest became an inviterate foe of the system and worked
unceasingly for its abolition.
Coughlin continued his indictment of the government relief programs

'.IeM·,

p. 51.

25
throughout 1934. The N.R.A. was again attacked.; the priest labeled
its forty cent per hour minimum wage as "slavery" and placed most ot
the blame for its inequalities on the manufacturers who he claimed

.

were attempting to "emasculate" the program.4 The Civil Works·

Mrn1o1etration also received severe censure. The priest asserted that
"•••its presence among us is a confession of past stupidity. Its

continuance among :.us is a certain step toward fascism." 5 Although
still favoring the lreside�t, Father Coughlin issued almost continuous
indictments of the Nev Deal over his radio network.
Coughlin's positive program for alleviating the depression called
for the replacement of American capitalism, which he called "doomed •••
and not worth trying to save" by some form of "socialized" or "state"
capitalism. He argued that since modern capitalism had refused to
reform itself there was no alternative but for the government to
control credit. On March 11, 19'4, the priest outlined his own six
point program for the solution of the financial problems facing the
n,.tion:
The nationalization and revaluation of all gold.
The restoration of silver coinage and the nationalization
of all silver.
The establishment of a government bank to control
currency and credit.
The complete nationalization of all credit.
Legislation to extend credit not only for
production but for consumption.
6
6. The total elimination of national government bonds.

l.
2.

His continued pressure, coupled with that from other inflationiets,
4New York Times, February 5, 19'4,.
5Ibid.
6
Tu11, op, cit., P• 54.
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elicited government action.
On April 24, 1934, Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau
released for publication the names of all persons and organizations
which had made substantial investments in silver.

Done with full

approval of the �,resident, this move was shrewdly intended to block
silver legislation from an inflation-minded Congress by discrediting
the motivation of IDaD1' of the leading advocates of silver coinqe. 7 The
moat interesting name to appear on the list was that of Father
Coughlin's Radio League of the Little Flower which held approximately
five hundred thousand ounces.

The purchases were made by Miss Amy

Collins, Coughlin's secretary, who claimed that ohe had made the
investment solely on her own responsibility.

She insisted that the

priest had no knowledge of the finances of the Radio League.
Coughlin, denying that he had ever purchased an ounce of silver,
bitterly assailed Morgenthau as "a tool of Wall Street" and pointedl1
8
praised silver as a "gentile" metal.
The results of the exposure are important.

Although the uproar

over the silver list was short-lived, Coughlin's reputation was
somewhat damaged. However, there was no evidence that the priest had
personally profitted from the transaction.

The episode marked the

first serious break between Coughlin and the Aidmini13tration.

In all

his indictments of Nev Deal policy, the priest had never personally
attacked Roosevelt.

In this case, Roosevelt, as well as Korgenthau,
/

was responsible for the expose.

It vould-appear that the jresident, who

7Schlesinger, The Coming
of the Ney
8uu York Times, April 29, 1934.

1
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never personally liked the priest, no longer considered it necessary
to avoid arousing his ire as he had in 1932-33.

The warm rapport o!

the post-election period had become polite neutrality by 1934.
With the close of his radio season in April,· 1934, Father
Coughlin temporarily receded from the scene.
what has been considered as the First New Deal c�e to a conclusion.

The priest had expected the-President to implement more sweeping
�conomic reforms than the essentially conservative ones of the period.
His continued pressure, via telegrams and letters requested of his
radio audience, had forced the President to resort to the drastic
measure of releasing the silver list.

Coughlin continued to expand

his opposition. to the New Deal until, in 1936, he became the moving
force behind a political attempt to challenge Roosevelt.
When Coughlin returned to the air in September, 1934, his
attitude toward the New Deal had markedly changed. In a form letter,
he asked his radio audience:
Do you want me to preach 'amen' both to the sins of
omission and·commission which have been perpetrated
in the name of the New Deal, or • • -. do you want
me to oppose both reactionary politicians as well as
the new type of rubber-stamp sycophants who prefer to
follow the dictates of the 'drain trust' rather than
the mandate of the voters? 9
Only the priest knew the response to this loaded question but the
very phrasing points out C�ughlin's contempt for the Nev Deal and
its architects.
The major question now was whether hi fiercely loyal audi_ence
9Tu11, op,tcit., P• 59.
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would remain so if he deserted the extremely popU.lar Roosevelt. Through
out the next year, his atatementa; vacillated from eU.logistic praise for
thel.,resident to violent condemnation. �y November, 1935, he had
decided upon opposition.
Roosevelt, recognizing the inevitability of the break, decided·
upon a two step approach.

He attempted to de!� the break for as

long as possible, and then, when it came, to make it Coughlin'a
decision. To implement this policy, the-President made it a practice
to avoid public mention of the priest, to use eminent Catholic· lqmen,
such as Detroit �or Frank Murpb;y and S.E.C. Executive Joseph
Kennedy, as peace emiasariee and to grant the priest minor favors,

10

A good example of the latter was the personal attention given
Coughlin's inquiry concerning a naval commission for a fellow priest,
Roosevelt sent a memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
asking "Will you let me know if we can do �thing about this? In
- maey"

11
When viewed in terms of such a plan,

•�s it might be helpful."

Coughlin's vacillation during 1935 is understandable.
The priest opened his 1934-1935 broadcasting season with an
endorsement of the New Deal, He said, "More than ever I am in favor
'of the New Deal," and then pledged himself to support it as long as
12
he possessed the power of speech,
One week later, Coughlin deplored
the lack of clear-cut distinc:tions between the two major parties and
lOibid,

11Ibid.,

P• 60,
1
2xu York Times, October
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29,

1934,
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hopefully suggested that they "reliDl,uish the skeletons of their
putrefying carcasses to the halls of a historical museum." He also
gave notice to the Democratic party that it had two years to solve the
1
monetary distribution problem or face "political death." 3
On November 11,

Father Coughlin presented his contribution to the

reformation of American politics.

On that

<la¥,

he announced the

formation.of 'the National Union for Social Justice. This organization
was composed of persons of all faiths who believed in the rightful
necessity of social justice in the economic life of the United States.
Coughlin's motivation stemmed from the thousands of letters which he
r.eceived. The priest felt that they gave him wierrilli sight into
the temper of the times. He states:
I am not boasting when I sa;y to you that I know the pulse
of the people. I know it better than all your newspaper
men. I know it better than do all your industrialists
with your paid for advice. I am not ex88gerating when
I tell you of their demand for social justice which,
like a tidal wave, is sweeping over this nation. 14
He hoped to create an organization through which public opinion
would influence admjnjAtration policies.
15

The National Union was based upon sixteen principles

promul

gated by �ather Coughlin. Essentially, they were a mixture of
midwestern agrarian reforms and the social encyclicals of Leo XIII
and Pius XI. Many of them had previously appeared in the Minnesota

13Charles E. Coughlin• A Series of Lectures on Social Justice
lRoyal Oak, Michigan: The Radio Le88Ue of the -Little Flower, 1935), p. 8.
14Ibid., P• 16.
15See Appendix 1.
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16
Farmer-Labor Party platform.
These principles were general and, to
· a large extent, outlined the various reforms which the priest had
championed. They contained demands for: a living wage, control ot
private property for the public good, absolute government control of
all currency, a fair profit for the farmer, the right of labor to
organize, and the priority of human rights over property rights.
With a call for five thousand members for the Union, Father
Coughlin took another step in the direction of a complete break with
the New Deal. His attempts to establish a balance of power between
the two major parties gave evidence that he was not afraid of para
political organizations and that his passive cii.scontent with the
Roosevelt adrn1u1etration was ending.
The formation of the National Union precipitated an immediate
reaction in Washington. Letters poured in upon the President. They
�xpressed a questioning attitude. Coughlin's audience was uncertain
1
·whether, by joining the National Union, they would help Roosevelt. 7
The priest appeared to recognize this tone, for in his regular broad.
cast on November 25, he declared that it would be wrong to suspect
18
the President's motives in any w�.
Coughlin, now that his break with the Administration was rapidly
becoming a reality, needed allies. His most obvious choice was
Senator Huey P. Long, Democrat from Louisiana. Both men had supported

'··

16Bruce Bonner Mason, ".American Political Protest, 1932-19%"
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P• 92..
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Roosevelt in 1932 and, by 1934, had grown disillusioned with the New
Deal. The alliance was a logical one; the Senator fo'U8ht the Adminjs
tration from the congressional floor while the priest used the radio.
Each had advantages to offer in case an alliance were concluded.

There

is little doubt that "the Kingfish" aspired to the presidency. To
achieve the goal, he needed liorthern and East!rn support which it
appeared Coughlin could supply. The priest, were he to desert the
President, would need another dynamic personality to promote. He
could not personally aspire to the executive office because of hie
foreign birth and clerical ·vocation.

Jim Farley, .. Democratic national

chairman, carried out a nation-wide survey to determine the effect of
Long as a presidential candidate.

The result indicated that an

amalgamation of these two forces would provide stiff political
19
competition for the established parties.
The first issue on which the two leaders effectively collaborated
was the defeat of American entrance into the World Court. Roosevelt
had requested the Senate to approve the entry of the United States
into the court.

This move toward internationalism aroused Coughlin'&

latent isolationism, previously seen in his reaction to .the London
Economic Conference. In his broadcast of January Z7, he announced
that the proposed entrance would"• •• hand over our national
sovereignity to the World Court, a creation of and for the League of
19 ames A. Farley, J
J
im Farl8Y's Stoq: The Rooeeyelt
(New Yorks McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1948), p. 51.

Years

Nations." He stressed tha� while agreeing with the -4dm1n1�tration's
attempts at social reform, he could not desecrate the memories of

Washington and Jefferson by accepting this measure.� In a surprising
.

move, the priest returned to the

air the following day to reiterate

his feelings in the last-ditch endeavor to defeat the measure.

He

called for a torrent of telegrams to be sent to the legislators
protesting American entrance.

2l Long led the opposition on the

Senate floor and, with the help of Coughlin's telegram barrage,
defeated the issue by a 52 to 36 vote.

It was later reported that

over 40,000 telegrams descended upon Washington in the two days
22
prior to the vote.
The apparent importance of the priest's call for cables greatly
encouraged him. Yet, it must be remembered that in 1935, America was
profoundly isolationistic in spirit. It would appear more logical
that Coughlin's action had given direction to a wideiy held na�ional
feeling rather than demonstrated loyalv on the part of hie audience.
The telegrams represent the opposition to involvement in international
affairs more than blind obedience to the priest's dictates. The
victory, however, gave him confidence to enlarge the scope of his
attack on the New Deal.
On March 3� 1935, Father Coughlin delivered an analysis of the
first two years of the New Deal. He accused Roosevelt of having
"compromised with the money changers and conciliated with monopolistic
20Coughlin, A Series of Lectures on Social Justice, PP• 12�25.
2 e
¼ w York Times, Januar, 29, 1Y35.
22Ibid.,
January 30, 1935.
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''
industry" and of "• •• holding out the olive branch to those
whose policies are crimsoned with the theories of sovietiam and
international socialism." He remarked further that:
1

The first two years of the new deal [sic] will long be
remembered as the years which enunciated a new philosophy
for future years to practice. However, they we� years
which, despite its [!:Jiq) gracious pronouncements, are still
wedded to the l:>asic evils of capitalism, to the fundamental
errors of the old deal. 2;iie money- changers h&Te not been
driven from the temple.

This savage indictment elicited the first administration response to
Coughlin.
On March 4, General Hugh Johnson, former N.R.A. administrator,
delivered a radio rebutUe which took to t41Sk both CoU&hliD. .nd Long.
The General accused them of leadi.D8 a lunatic fringe and called them
a menace to the nation. He concluded the speech by s� "These two
men are r� up and down this land preaching not construction, but
destruction-not refom but revolution, not peace but-a sword. I
think we are dealing with a couple of Catilines, and that it is high
time for someone to sa:y so."

24

The attack shocked the priest.

Never before had an adm1nietration confidant dignified his criticism
with an answer. Coughlin, fearful of its effect on his following,
reversed his position.
The national network granted both Long and the priest time to
answer the General. The Kingfish surprised everyone by limiting his
response to a defense of his "share-our-wealth" movement.
23coughlin, A Series Of Lectures on
2
York Times, .March 5, 19:,5�

4H,,

\

Social Justice,

His speech
PP• 194-95,

25
attracted considerable favorable response. Coughlin, influenced
perhaps by the tone of his correspondence, reiterated his support
for the New Deal.

This caused Long to become somewhat disgusted
26
with the priest and weakened their already tenuous.alliance.
The short rapprochement between Roosevelt and Coughlin was ended
by the.�•resident•s veto of the Patman Bill.

On� 5, Coughlin had

endorsed this plan which provided for an issue of greenbacks to
finance the bonus pa;yments. Using the technique which had defeated·
the World Court issue, Coughlin requested his audience to bombard
Congress with wires favoring the bill.

Thousands complied and the

measure passed by a large margin.Z7 The President, firmly opposed to
greenback inflation, vetoed the bill. To reinforce _his stand, the
1

president appeared before Congress and::�equested it to sustain the
veto.

Contrary to Coughlin's wishes, the Senate supported Roosevelt

and the priest was again alienated.
Coughlin now began a concerted effort to marsh&l his public
support. Rather than leave the air in early April as he had done
28
since 1930, he purchased thirteen add.i.tional weeks of air time.
He also initiated a series of public rallies to stimulate enthusiasm
for the National Union for Social Justice and to increase its effective
ness as a pressure group. He scheduled major rallies in Detroit,
Cleveland, and New York. At these three gatherings, a combined total
25schlesinger, The Politics of Upheaval, P•
26 son, o
Dy
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York Times,
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of 63,000 people heard the priest criticize the capitalistic system and
9
the Roosevelt administration.2 During the early spring, Coughlin
endeavored to establish a foundation tor continued opposition to
Roosevelt.
Hie actions du.ring the sl.UIUller of 1935 were in complete contrast
to the previous period. Coughlin made no further.personal appearances, his radio discourses were moderate in tone and he recalled hie
congressional lobbyist, Louis Ward, before the session closed. The
lack of activity caused maey rumors concerning the future of the
priest and the National Union. The only clarifying statement which
he issued was a denial that the Union was to be disbanded and that he
would return to the Roosevelt fold. He informed the New York Times
that "I am neither supporting Roosevelt, nor :-opposing him. I am
determined to support principles, and not men. The major principle is
:,0
the nationalization of credit."
Coughlin scholars attributed the silence to the death of Huey
Long. The ebullient senator from .Louisiana had. been assassinated
in the Louisiana capitol on September 8, 1935. Any plans which

Coughlin might have had for future l)Olitical activity . in-.conjunctioD..\'

vith the . Senator, ·vere·:;iJi:mle�ately ended.

it was: .obvious . .. that none

among Long's followers could ma,tch his appeal on the national l,evel.
The l)riest vas forced to consider carefully' his next move.
29
.lR!!i., PP• 95-97.
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Coughlin crossed his Rubicon on November 17, 1935. On this date,
the priest and the President broke irrEm> cably. Apparently confident
of the loyalty of hie audience, Coughlin blatantly announced that the
principles of the New Deal and social justice were "unalterably
opposed". He charged that the Roosevelt administration had embraced

both communism
and plutocracy and was no l�nger deserving of support." 31
,
I
The long heralded break had become a reality.
The causes of the break stretched back to the Detroit banking
issue of March, 1933, and included such controversial occurrences as
the release of the silver holdings list, the battle over the World
Court, General Johnson's speech and the defeat of the Patman Bonus
Bill.

In the final analysis, however, it was caused by two distinct

but related reasons. The priest based his solution to the depresaion
essentially upon a policy of inflation. Roosevelt had initiated
inflation in 1933, had seen it fail and was no longer interested in
it. Secondly, the priest considered himself partially responsible
for Roosevelt's election. He therefore felt that he should be included
as an intimate of the .Ai.dministration, being allowed to function as
a private adviser and a public spokesman. He did not compare intellec
tually with the other members of the "brains trust" and so was unfit
for the first and, given Roosevelt's own radio ability, completely
unnecessary as the second.
The priest felt that his program must be enacted before the
depression could be,,expeat.ed to lessen its severity. The political
altetnat:i:_vea. -lsft. open: :to; Wllll!;vei:_e. ,fer. .,lie wu. .:poesible .for him to
31 , Ibid., NoTember 18, 1935.

abandon radio broad.casting, but his crusading zeal prevented that.
He could return to his support of Roosevelt, but that meant
desertion of his inflationary principles with no hope of future
success, for Roosevelt would give nothing in return. He could
endeavor to make a bargain with the Republicans, but the·available
candidates were unappealing and the chances of success slim.
Coughlin accepted the fi.naJ. alternative, to ignore the established
po..i'tical macb1oery- and to utilize the National Union as a para-political pressure grOup to influence the election of the "right"
men to_Congreaa. Third party political action reaulted.l

1

•

38

Father Cougblin's blunt denunciation of the-Nev Deal on November 17,
appears to have exaggerated his true feelings.

A more accurate

representation of his feelings came from his radio broadcast of
December l, 1935.

The priest qualified hie statement that the

principles of the Nev Deal and social justice were "unalterably
opposed" by stating that he had.no desire to obstruct the Nev Deal but
wanted only to perfect it. He explained his new statement by s�ing
that he opposed its extravagant experiments and reactionary tenden
cies..

Coughlin, further modifying hie views, now contended that the
.
l
President was not "the only man who can save_America". Until the fo-rmation of the Union Party, he maintained this approach.
Another indication of the priest's interest in political action
was his continued search for allies. During the first week of
December, 1935, Francis E. Townsend, the originator of the Townsend
Old Age Pension Plan, visited Royal Oak. Political observers predicted
that the two men would establish

an alliance,

but, the California

doctor emphatically denied that one had even been considered. He
reported to the New York Times, however, that Coughlin had endorsed
2
his pension scheme.
The last broadcast of 1935 continued Coughlin's movement toward
. independent political action.

On December 29, he announced his desire

to inaugurate a weekly magazine,"to interpret the nelfB." He said that
1

iew York Times, .December · 2, 1935.•
�., .December 10, 1935.
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3
he would do so if one million listeners would write in their approval,
Whether he received the requested response is known only to Coughlin;
the magazine, entitled Social Justice, appeared on March 13, 1936.
The magazine faithfully mirrored the opinions of its creator.
Much of the material contained reflected Coughlin's background.

In

the interpretation of foreign affairs, his Catholicism was evident
in the magazine's assault against the Republican governments of Spain

---

and Mexico as communistic.

His Irish background'.. · led to the indictment

·--

of the British as the perverters of American foreign policy.

Finally,

his desire to see the depression conquered caused him to praise the
achievements of Mussolini and Hitler in successfully solving the
. economic problems of Italy and Germany. There was little doubt who
directed the policy of Social Justice.
The physical structure of the magazine also proved interesting.
It was strictly limited to sixteen pages, perhaps in honor of the
sixteen principles ot social justice.

Coughlin was determined

to operate the paper without commercial advertising of any nature; he
was successful until late 1938,

Furthermore, he made virtually no use

of pictures witil the political compaign of 1936 was well under wq,
The usual breakdown of the magazine's contunt was: two pages of
national news, one page each for world news, labor, agriculture,
youth, women's news, letters to the editor, and National Union for
Social Justice bulletins, and two pages devoted to turning the
"searchlight on the,Money Changers" with the remaining space devoted

3�-,
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to the reprint of the entire text of the priest'■ radio broadcast,
his "weekly letter" to the readers, and the editorial page. All ·or
the articles contained an obvious editorial slant supporting Coughlin's

personal theories.4

Coughlin's establishment of the magazine brought him into contact
with another figure who was to become a close confidant. Following the
announcement of a weekly publication, E.Perrin Schwarz, city editor of
the Milwaukee Journal, wrote to the priest and outlined his ideas on
how the new magazine should be organized. Coughlin included his
suggestions on one of the Sun� broadcasts,then telephoned him the
next� to.otter the editorship of the new weekly. Schwarz accepted
and remained with Social Justice until Coughlin was forced to suspend
publication in 1942.5
With the publication of Social Justice. Coughlin possesed a
potent auxiliary weapon to complement his radio broadcasts. It allowed
him to expand his audience, overcome

an

increasingly unfavorable press

image, and effectively indoctrinate his followers. It became his
major line with the expanding National Union, aiding him in directing
its activities throl.18h weekly bulletins. The priest's increasing use
of Social Justice

as an

avowedly political organ was another step in

the direction of third party action in 19360
Another"prominent change which eminated from the break with the
,President was.the refo:nnation and re-activation of the National Union.

-

I

4So i J
o al ustice, March 13, 19:,6 to NoT•ber 23, 19)6.
5 11
Tu , op, cit., P• u,.
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Coughlin now aimed at establiahiDg e minimum of one chapter of the
Union in every congressional district in the nation.

To accomplish this

task, he undertook a total reconstruction ot the organization.
0-riginall.y, it was divided into local units composed of no less than
one hundred members.

When some units, particularly in the rural areas,

found it difficult to recruit so large a number, _Coughlin lowered the
minimum unit membership to twenty-five in communities of' less than one
6
thousand and to fifty in towns of one thousand or more. To prevent the
structure from becoming unvieldly, no single unit could enroll more
than ·:tvo hundred._fif'ty members.
Each'local chapter of the National Union was empowered to elect a
president, as was each congressional district. The activities of each
state organization were to be directed by an elected state supervisor.
The national leadership consisted of twelve regional supervisors,
responsible to the national president, Father Cougblin.7

The priest recommended that unit meetings be conducted at least
once a month, at which time the president was to read a special mess869
from Coughlin.

The members were strongly requested to devote a sub

stantial segment of the meeting to the serious discussion on one of
the sixteen principles of' social justice. In an attempt to thoroughly
imbue the membership with Cougblin's monetary theories, the editors
of Social Justice pushed Cougblin's f�cial treatise, Money!
8
Questions and Answers, as material essential for discussion.
•

I

6
Social Justice, March 20, 19'6.
7Ibid., March ZT, 19'6.
8
Ibid.
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The early course of the Union did not run smoothly. Resentment
existed over the requirement of mandatory recitation of the Social
Justice pledge at the close of each meeting. It read "I pled8e to
follow the example of Jesus Christ who drove the money changers froa
the temple because they exploited the poor." Letters written to the
magazine made it apparent that Jews, athiests, �ostics ·and even a
few Christians were opposed to the mention of Christ. The priest
insisted that the oath remain unchanged. Furthermore, Coughlin feared
that outsiders might sneak in and disrupt the meetings. He therefore
recommended that a sergeant-at-arms be appointed to check membership
credentials before admitting people to the meeting. To assure his
continued control of the Union, Coughlin �ave the order that chapters ·
cou.Ld be addressed only by feilow members of the National Union who
·: were sanctioned by the state officers. Finally, all mans meetings of
any nature were banned because he feared that the membership might be
swqed:ir some silver toogued politician were allowed to speak at
a . mass meeting of its members"; 9 a rather ironic statement considering
its source.
On April 20, the National Union filed its first financial report.
It explains how Coughlin financed his organization. The report

.

disclosed that the Union had raised $101,060 in the two month period
commencing approximately Feb� 20.

The major portion of that sum,

10

however, had been borrowed from the Radio League of the Little Flower.

9Ibid., April :,, 19:,6.
10
116,692.
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In addition, Cough).in'e parish had loaned the fledgling $2,000.
Thus, only $22,368 represented actual contributions. Of this amount
1
only $925 consisted of donations of one hundred dollars or more. ½iie
report would seem to substantiate the theory that the priest possessed
no large :financial bacld.Jl8 and actually relied upon the nickles, dimes,
and dollars contributed by the poor.
The revised National Union sought to achieve the status of a
potent political force using its influence to affect congressional
elections. In Janus.ry, 1936, Coughlin estima�ed that chapters had
been established in 302 of the nation's 435 congressional districts
lie interpreted this as a clear warning to all congreaamon that his \
.
"loQby of the people" was a force to be reckoned with.12
Thro\18hout the early months of 19}6, Coughlin worked to solidify
his organization, He promulgated the criteria used to judge whether
candidates could be endorsed. Political affiliation was not a relevant
factor. However, he did stipulate that no member of the Union itself
would receive its endorsement. To be considered eligible, the
candidate had to publish, at least· three times, his pledge to support
the principles of social justice. The final authorization of all

l
endorsements was reserved by the central office, which was Coughlin. }
Coughlin envisioned the role of the National Union as a civic
mindei,para-political force which would compel the selection of good
candidates from both major parties by ignoring established labels

ew York
J¾
12

Times, April 21, 1936.
Ibid., January 6, 1936,
13
soc1a1 Justice., March 20, 1936�
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and supportillg men on their individual merits. He contended that)
"the stupidity of voting for a person because he waves the Republican
black banner of reaction or because he flaunts the pink pennant of
Nev Deal Democracy is outmoded." In addition, he counseled the
membership to retain their regular political affiliation because it
14
Coughlin prepared
was essential to participation in the primaries.
to test his influence vith the electorate. The National Union for
Social Justice was reformed and ready for action in the 1936 primaries.
Before analyzing the National Union's influence upon the primary
campaigns of 1936, it ia necessary to examine Coughlin's actions on
the national scene. Simultaneously with his reconstruction of the
Union, he began an ill-fated attempt to force the passage of the third
Frazier-Lemke Farm Mortgage Bill. The results of this crusade have a
direct bearing on the formation of the Union Party.
The Frazier-Lemke Bill was jointly sponsored by Senator Lynn
Frazier and Representative William Lemke, both of North Dakota. It
called for the Federal Government, acting through the Farm Credit
.Administration and the Federal Reserve System, to purchase all farm
mortgages and permit the holders to gradually liquidate them at 1.5
per cent interest. The purchases were to be financed by the floatation
of a special bond issue.

The Federal Reserve Board would be obligated

to purchase all bonds not claimed by priTate investors and to deliver
Federal Reserve notes equal to the Talue of the bonds, _but not to
15
exceed three billion dollars.
In •--sence, this was interpreted as

1

'1lli., April 17, 1936.
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promising a three billion dollar issue of greenbacks to put the
government in the farm mortgage business on a mammouth scale.
Coughlin vigorously defended the unorthodox financial measures
of the Frazier-Lemke Bill. In keeping with his monetary theories, he
maintained that the bond issue vould be backed by the "real wealth"
of the nation-its fields, crops, farm buildings,_and implements. This
again emphasized his feeling that money vas not real wealth but merely
a "means of exchange".

The priest had ample support for his stand on the bill. The
legislatures of thirty-three states had adopted resolutions advocating
its pase889 and a sizeable number of congressmen, mirroring their
constituencies, lent their support to the measure. 16 Roosevelt,
however, was opposed to the bill because of its inflationar;y
tendencies.
The Democratic majority in the House of Representatives supported
the �esident's stand and attempted to bottle up the bill in committee.
Representative John O'Connor of Nev York, Chairman of the House Rules
Committee, exerted every possible del� technique to prevent the
1
bill from reachi.Dg the floor of the House. 7
Coughlin immediately reacted to this evasive strategy. First, he
pressured the admjni�tration through his Washington lobbyist, Louis
Ward, but Roosevelt refused to submit. Then, he attacked the President

on his radio program. He demanded that Roosevelt either endorse the
1

cit., P• 59.
op, o1t., P• 1oe.

�on, op,
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bill or take responsibility for its death in committee.
,

The priest

further claimed that the President had pledged himself to the principles
contained in the Frazier-Lemke Bill in a 19,2 campaign speech delivered
in Sioux City, Iowa. He accused Roosevelt of betraying the farmers'
trust and emotionally announced that,"Not once had you intervened
for the bW which you promised to sustain ••• Meanwhile, ,2 million
residents of farm states of America, defrauded of their hire,,.
raised their voices to higneet heaven for vengence which God will DOt
d

eey.

"

18

An interesting and amusing outcome of Coughlin's fight for the
Frazier-Lemke Bill was his verbal battle with Representative O'Connor.
The two Irish-Catholics vehemently denounced each other nth the f.eud
culminating in O'Connor's threat that:
If you (Coughlin] will please come to Washington I shall
guarantee to kick you all the way from the Capitol to the
White House with clerical garb and all the silver in your
pockets which you got from speculating in Wall Street
while I was voting for all the farm bills. 19
Although the priest accepted the challenge, Bishop Gallagher, hie
religious superior, counseled moderation and the priest Ca.J;lceled his
trip to the Capitol.

This is a portent of the priest's willingness to

involve himself in the kind of personal invective that would play a
major role in the election campaign of 19'6.
Throughout March and April, Father Coughlin continued hie crusade
for the Frazier-Lemke BW. The petition to release the bill from
1
8i.,x York Times, Februar,r 17, 1936.
19
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committee needed 218 signatures. Partially through the priest's
efforts, the number of signers slowly increased. On April 30, it
, finally achieved the magic number and it was.released with debate
20
The sta&e.was now set for the most important
scheduled for Mq 11.
period in Coughlin's career.
The priest was now ready to test his power. The primary campaigns
were about to start and a bill that he had marked as Virtually
indispensible was up for consideration. He was prepared to pull out
all stops to show his influence and impress the Roosevelt edro1nietra
tion. lf he could achieve sufficiently spectacular results there would
be no need to progress further with his opposition to the President.
If, however, he failed to achieve his goals, further, more drastic
action vou.J.d become necessary. The period from Jtid-April until the
end of M� would be pivotal in detennining his actions during the
presidential campaign of 1936.
The first primary test for the reformed National Union came in
Pennsylvania. The state primary elections were scheduled for April 28,
The Union had only a week to organize for the campaign, yet it endorsed
candidates in twenty-four of the state!-s thirty-four congressional
districts. When the returns were counted, twelve endorsees had
emerged victorious. This astonishing result, achieved without benefit
of extensive campaigning or monetary outl�, greatly heartened
Coughlin. Social Justice openly boasted of the success. The Mq 8
issue pro_claimed,in bold headlines,that '"fictories

in

Pennsylvania

Spur National Union's Fighters in Ohio--Bominate Twelve Candidates-

3:>Social

Justice,

Mq 15, 1936.
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Unseat Two Congressmen." The paper further proclaimed that the defeated
endorsees would run aa independent candidates and with the Union backing
21
were virtually assured of election.
The actual significance of the Pennsylvania primary is open to
question. Of Coughlin's twelve victors, ten were incumbents; this
tends to lessen the significance of their achievement due to the
·.)

intrinsic ed89 which the incumbent possesses. An important exception,
however, was the victory of Michael J. Stark, incumbent Philadelphia
Democrat, who had been repudiated by the party organization. With
the aid of the National Union, he was renominated. 22 .Although
Co�in'e influence was felt in Permaylv4Ulia, it te· eafe to oonol�d•
that he greatly overestimated his power--a flaw observable throughout
his career.
The National Union was now ready for an all-out effort. Greatly
encouraged by their Pennsylvania "victory", they -P�P&:n4- . 1P�:•,., fo;:
the Ohio primary. The prognosis was promising; Coughlin claimed
250,000 followers in the state and the date of the election, l>Uli112,
gave ample time to organize a concerted effort. The priest used all
the pressure-group tactics available to influence the Ohio electorate.
Social Justice became a propaganda sheet for the endorsed Ohio
earl.di.dates .. It gave them lead space and issued instructions to the
National Union chapters on how best to promote their interests.
Throughout the campaign, it optimistically predicted a sroasb1ng victory.
CousbJ.in vent to considerable expense to provide propaganda accoutrement
21Ibid., Mq 8, 19'6.

2Z:ui1, op, cit., P• 118.

for his followers. Leaflets, badges and pins (bearing Cougblin's
likeness) were distributed throughout the state.23 iothing was
wanting in the attempt to influence voters.
Coughlin attached enough importance to the Ohio primary to
personall7 campaign throughout the state. He spoke before an enthusias
tic orovd of twenty thousand at Toledo on May a. His regular Swiday
broadcast of Mq 10, waa delivere� in Cleveland before a live audience
of twenty-five thousand. This speech was also carried over the radio
network and, to insure blanket coverage of Ohio, Coughlin's normal
outlets, WGAR, Cleveland, and WLW, Cincinnati, were supplemented by
24
WBNX, Columbus, and WSPD, Toledo •.
. The exhaustive efforts in Ohio paid handsome dividends. National
Union candidates were nominated in thirteen of the eighteen congressional
districts in which endorsements had been made. Social Justice
jubilantly proclaimed. an overwhelming victory. The headline

read

"Smasb1ng Success in Ohio Primaries Added to National Union V�ctory

Roll." 25 More importantly, the New York Times was also impressed.
Its'article stated that:

Not only dd.d the National Union for Social Justice score a
triumph over incumbent lawmakers, but apparently fifteen of
its thirty-two endorsees were nominated with the
possibility of the sixteenth being added by the late
returns••• The strength of the National Union for Social
26
Justice was one of the big surprises of the state-wide primary.
"lt was obvious that Coughlin had achieved. his goal. The article's
23
Dyson, op, cit., P• 36.
2
�ew York Times, Mq u, 1936.
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Soc1a1 Justice, .Mq ZT, 19'6.
2
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concluding sentence provides an excellent capsule summary of the
priest's aim.

"Politicians can look forward to a fall campaign. • •

complicated by a new and important factor of a sort they have not
had to contend with for years." 'Z7
Certain trends within the victory, which the Coughlin forces
overlooked, however, pointed in a different direction. Of the Union's
fifteen victorious candidates, only three were Republicans. Of the
seventeen defeated, eleven were Republicans.28 It would appear that
being a Democrat was almost as important as being endorsed by the
National Union. Later, when the voters were forced to chose between
. the two, the Democratic label proved eminently more valuable.
In the midst of hie success, Coughlin suffered a serious setback.
When the vote on the Frazier-Lemke Bill was taken, also on M� 12,
the measure went down to defeat by the substantial margin of 234-142.
The opposition to the bill had centered its a�tention on the inflationary
aspects. The turning point of the debate came when Speaker of the
House, Joseph V. Byrns, read a letter from American Federation of
Labor President, Villiam Green, asserting labor's opposition to the
measure as inflationary and requesting all friends of labor to
29
oppose it.
To Coughlin this was a bitter disappointment. Be placed the blame
directly upon the labor leader. He called Green an "honest• but
'Z/Ibid.
2&rui_1, op, cit., P• 119.
29New
Torie Times. 11q 14,·1936.
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"incapable" individual who had allowed himself' to be used as a
"tool of the money interests." He also threatened retribution in
November against those who had opposed the measure.'° In considering
how to make-pd hia threat, Coughlin confronted another momentous
decision.

I.

30Soc1a1 Justice, x.,

22, 1936.
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V
What would be Coughlin' s reaction to the defeat ot the Frazier- .
Lemke Bill? He had gone all out tor its passap, claiming that the
rate of America's farmers hung in the balance. Following his primary
victories, he was certain to undertake drastic action.

Due to his

failure to defeat Roosevelt on this issue, the future success of hie
social justice program depended upon it. Although Coughlin was to d�
arr, intention or third party action, it remained in the wind.
Until the end of Mq, however, there was a distinct possibility
that the priest might, in the 1936 campaign., transfer his allegiance to
the Republican partyo

Early in the year, William Ji: • .t3orah, liberal

Republican senator from Idaho, was. a.leading contender for his party's
nomination.

His position on the issues of monopoly, agricultural

refom, labor legislation, and old age relief were in harmony with
l
the principles of social justice. All that appeared necessary to
bring the two men together was rapport on some concrete issue.
In the early months of 1936, Borah strengthened his position by
sweeping to victory in the Wisconsin presidential primary and
defeating Colonel Frank Knox, a definite dark horse, in the Illinois
2
primary. It appeared that he had taken the inside track. These
victories, coupled with an apoOlVPhal statement which appeared to
coincide with Coughlin i s view on the coinage of money prompted the
priest to take action.

1Schleainger
, The Politics
2
�., P• 540.

of Upheaval,
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In the April 17 iesue of Social Justice, Coughlin published an open
letter to the Senator. He requested a firm reaffirmation of the ,
pri-tious statement on coinage. • The priest further praised Borah's
stand on world affairs . ,and hie indictment of communieui' in Mexico.
The letter concluded with the request that Borah answer it for
publication as soon as was convenient.' The implication that
endorsement would follow a favorable response was substantiated by
continued complimentary references to the Senator in the April 24 and
1'1q l issues of the magazine.
&rah's answer arrived on Mq 22. J::lis letter was a masterpiece
of political non-commitment. He thanked the priest for his confidence,
promised to continue the battle in Washington for honest reform
legislation, and skirted the monetary issue by s�ing that he had not
deeply considered the implications inherent in this interpretation of
congressional coinage. He closed by telling Coughlin to continue his
4
efforts on behalf of America's economically dovntrodden. Both the
del� of the answer and the tone of the letter made it obvious that
he desired no link with the National Union.

By

the time the letter arrived, Borah had fallen from a posi�ion

of serious contention.

The front runner, Governor Alfred M. Landon

of Kansas, was anathema to Coughlin. He called the Governor "dumb"
and commented that if the Republicans nominated him they would be
attempting to put the nation on "the 1 booby standard." 5 Landon's
3 c
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Justice,
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unanimous nomination at Cleveland in June ended arq possibility that
the priest would support the G.O.P. in 1936.
The third party issue now loomed larger than ever.

In a

Social

Justice editorial entitled "The Last Straw" Coughlin made his tiret
I

cryptic reference to third party action:
With the defeat of the Frazier-Lemke bill the last straw
has fallen upon our wearied backs. The last hope tor
financial reform under the New Deal has vanished.
Approximately 150 members of Congress have been
driven, politically and economically, into no
man's land.
Untold numbers of American citizens vho believe
in democracy and the high purpose of this nation
have been driven vith them • • • The 150 Congressmen ....
and their millions of constituents will not remain
bewildered in no man's land nor will they return in
desperation to the Nev Deal which is nothing more than
the Old Deal turned inside out.
6
Take this determination for what it is worth.
Be continued this line of reasoning in his weekly letter in the same
issue. Be entitled the letter "Where do we go from here."

"Within

two or three weeks," he concluded, "I shall be able to disclose the
first chapter of a plan, which if followed out, will discomfort the
erstwhile sham battlers, both Republican and Democratic. We must go
to victory from the primaries." 7 The formation of a third party was
drawing rapidly _closer.
The available material from which to construct a third party
movement appeared more than adequate. Althoue;h Bu.ey Long was dead,

6
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his organization still existed under the titular guidance of the
Reverend Gerald L.K. Smith. Both the Share--Our \iealth movement and
the National Union for Social Justice were opposed to Roosevelt's
re-election. Also, there remained the nebulous connections between
the two organizations that had been formed before "the Kingfish" was
assassinated. Furthermore, a third organization was rapidly approaching
independent action. Doctor Francis E. Townsend's Old Age Pension clubs
had never supported Roosevelt. The Reverend Smith had ingratiated
·�

himself with the Dcotor late in 1935 and, by .Mq, 1936, virtually
8
directed his thinldng. All of these organizations had as a pri.mary
goal monetary reform and wide;r distribution of inco111e. Though tl'u�y
did not agree upon the exact details, their ideas were not incompatible.
As early as� 22, Smith predicted that the followers of Coughlin:,
Townsend, and himself were about to "congeal under a leadership with
guts." 9 Social Justice echoed Smith and pointed out the nearness·
of united action when it commented that:
While the principles of the Townsend Plan are most
beneficial it is our conviction that such reform
· cannot be expected to meet with any degree of success
under our present economic conditions. The aims that
the Townsend Clubs are striving to obtain are
automatically included in: the sixteen prin!Oples
of the National Union for Social Justice.
The issue had reached the critical period.
In the June 5, issue, Social Justice mirrored an important change
in Coughlin's attitude toward Roosevelt. Since the break, late in

1935, he had advocated reform of the New Deal. Now he demanded its
8
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removal. In his regular editorial, Coughlin stated that, "The opposing
lines are already drawn. The Roosevelt administration, on one hand,
bent on Communistic.revolution: on the other, a public opinion
progressively enlightened, as never before, on matters of monetary
finance." The priest continued that the President was attempting to
establish a personal dictatorship..in order to install regimentation
with little interference. He inferred that removal was -the only
ll
solution. This was the opening note of Coughlin's 1936 campaign.
It outlined the thesis which would recur countless times from June
until November.
The third party issue was more clearly foreshadowed in the June 12
issue of Social Justice. Again in his editorial, the priest urged his
_audience to stand by for portentQUS,. developments. He told the
readers that:
The activities of the National Union will increase.
tremendously immediately following June 16 or 17.
Approximately at that time I shall lay down a plan
for action which will thrill you and inspire you
beyond &Jzything that I have ever said or accomplished
in the past. Already the plan is completed. The
statement is prepared. The element of time prevents
my mentioning it at this moment.
Furthermore, he clearly hinted at the possibility of a new party
when I he requested his followers to maintain complete faith in his
judgment for the next six months and patiently await the explanation
of his subsequent conduct which would appear in Social Justice. He
emphasized the possibility of independent action by emphatically
promising that no .congressman who had opposed the �uier-Lemke bill
ll
Ibid., June 5, 19:,6.
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would be endorsed by the National Union.12
The inner history of the following week remains obscure. On the
surface, Coughlin received ano·ther affirmation of his national
influence. The Maine primary was held on June 16. Although the state
was a bedrock of Republican conservatism, the National Union had

diligently labored to secure the nomination of three candidates who
had endorsed the social justice program. Only one of the three was
actually victorious� Still, the New York Times gave the Union
credit for the exceptionally heavy voter turnout in the state

and

expres�ed surprise at Coughlin v s appeal within the Republican party. l:,

Again, the priest was supported in hie analysis of his own power. It
is safe to surmise that it emboldened him to continue his course of

action.
When interviewed about his Maine "victory", Coughlin admitted to a
Nev York Times reporter that he considered a third party a virtual ·
certainty, but denied that he would take an active part in its
formation and absolutely refused to speculate concerning the identity of
the possible candidate. He inferred, however, that further information
would be released on the first of his special summer broadcast series
1
scheduled for June 19. 4
Coughlin never

had

the chance to make the initial announcement

about the formation of the Union Party. On June 17, Gerald L.K. Smith
disclosed that a coalition had been formed consisting of the National
12Ibid. P June l2 19 6. ·
3
p
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Union for Social Justice, the �hare--Our-Wealth movement, the Old Air,e
Yension Clubs, and the supporters of Representative William Lemke of
North Dakota. He stated that Lemke would serve as the presidential
1
candidate. 5 What had been so long forecast finally appeared in an
exceedingly) anti-climactic manner.

The first public reaction to the announcment_ came from Dr.

Townsend. He immediately denied having made any commitments, but
indicated he would be willing to consider such a coalition if the
occasion presented itself.

What thoughts Coughlin held concerning

the premature disclosure remain unknown for the priest kept his own
1
col...isel. He doggedly maintained hie schedule refusing to release

any comment prior to June 19. Lemke announced hie candidacy on the
nineteenth, just prior to the priest's broadcast1and thus substantiated
16
Smith's disclosure.
Coughlin's broadcast stated that Lemke was "eligible for endor
aation [sicJ" as a presidential candidate by the National Union.

He devoted the major portion of the broadcast to castigating the
established parties. His denouncement of Roosevelt and the New Deal
achieved a high point of emotional eloquence:
At last, when the most brilliant minds among the industrialists,
bankers. and their kept politicians had failed to solve
these questions on the principles upon which the Old
Deal had operated, there appeared upon the scene of our
national life a new champion of the people, Franklin D.
Roosevelt. He spoke golden words of hope to the people.
Never since the da3s of the gentle Master and His Sermon
15
Ibid., Jnne 18, 1936.
16
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on the Mount were such humanitarian principles enunciated •••
The thrill tHat WaS mine was yours. Through the dim
clouds of the depression this man, Roosevelt, was, as
it were, a new savior of his people ••• It is not
pleasant for me who coined the phrase "Roosevelt or ruin"a phrase based upon promises-to voice such passionate
words. But I am constrained to admit that "Roosevelt
and ruin" is the order of the day bees.use the mon�
changers have not been driven from the temple. i·r
The Republican party received an equal, if n9t as eloquent,
castigation:
Alas! These Punch and Judy Republicans·, whose actions and
words were dominated by the ventriloquists of Wall Street,
are so blind that they do not recognize, even in this perilous
hour, that their gold basis and their private coinage of
money have bred more radicals than did Karl Marx or Lenin.
18
To their system of ox cart financialism we must never return.
Coughlin chose his title for the party from Lincoln's "Union
]arty." The analogy which he draws is somewhat forced to sey the
least.

\

"In 1864 when Lincoln proposed to abolish plzysical slavery

there was established a 'union party!

In 1936, when we are determined

to annihilate financial slavery, we welcome the 'union party' because
it has the courage to go to the root of our troubles."
The priest further announced that Lemke's candidacy would be
complemented by that of Thomas Charles O'Brien of Boston, Massachusetts,
former district attorney for that city and coW1Sel for the Brother19
hood of Railwey Trainmen, running for the vice-presidency.
Tl1eoretically, the Union Party possessed an unbeatable ticket: Lemke
vas a Westerner, a Protestant, a Republican, and a representative of the
17social Justice, June 22, 1936.
18
Ibid.
19Ibid.
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farm interesti O'Brien was an Easterner, a C�tholic, a Democrat, and
a representatiY s of the interests o{..labor..
Coughlin placed his career on the line in supporting the formation
of a third party. Never in American history had one succeeded in
establishing itself as a replacement for a vigorous major party.
The internal inconsistencies of the Union �arty further jeopardized
its chances of success.

Finally, its late start and lack of functioning

organization could prove to be nothing but an impediment.
Coughlin, however, had little choice.

He was thoroughly convinced

that his program of "social justice" was the only solution to the
depression.
rebuked.

He had attempted to convince Roosevelt and had been

Ilia plan to by-pass the Ohief �xecutive and obtain control

of Congress through para-political pressure, while initially successful,
would have required too much time if it had been continued.

Also,

his endeavor to force the President to recognize his influence had
been defeated with the Frazier-Lemke bill.

Coughlin now had only one

alternative--to match his own charismatic attraction against that of
Roosevelt.
There were certain factors which made it appear that victory
might not be too hopeless.

If the "union" could marshal the latent

membership which its three component unite claimed it would be
formidable.
pivotal.

The national distribution of the membership was also

Vith the National Union claiming its strongest adherante
•

I

in the Mid-vest and on the Eastern coast, the Share-Our-Veal.th
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movement entrenched in the South and the Old Age Pensioners based 1n
the Far West, the party was theoretically capable of
controlling the essential. states.

Finally, Coughlin's success in

the various primaries made it appear that victory could be won with
hard work.

At the start of the campaign, then, the priest had slight,

al.though apparently sound, reason for hope.
The campaign and the candidates were, however, to undermine
these hopes.

Certain basic errors in strategy coupled with a lack

of understanding of the American political system doomed the party
from the very outset.

The enormity of the defeat, when it came,

affected Coughlin profoundly.

The period from June �9 to November 4

was pivotal. in determining his actions in subsequent years.

To

comprehend this effect, a thorough analysis of the Union farty
campaign of 19:,6 i11 necesaary.
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VI
Before analyzing the Union Party campaign, it is necessary to
investigate further the background of its candidates. Such an
investigation will aid in explaining the organization and direction of
the new party.

Furthermore, a close analysis of Lemke and O'Brien

will clarify their relationship to Coughlin •. His choice of Lemke was
not an illogical one.

The North Dakotan had a good education that

included study at the University of North Dakota, G�orgetovn University,
and Yale Law School. After he received his law degree,he entered state
politics. Hie eympuhy with agrarian discontent brougnt him to the
attention of Arthur Townley, the organizer of the Non-Partisan League,
who hired him as an attorney for this new agrarian movement which
became a controversial part of North Dakota politics in 1915. He
proved to have the qualities needed to assist in directing the new
1
organization and soon become one of its leaders.
As a young lawyer, Lemke had registered Republican, but he
evidenced little party loyalty. He operated under the party banner
solely because the Non-Partisan

League

dominated the G.O.P. in

North Dakota.2 In fact, during the 1920's he worked most often
outside the two major parties, believing that neither offered the
policies or the leadership which would relieve the depressed conditions
1Edward c • .Blackorby, "Villaim Lemke: Agrarian Radical and Union
Party Presidential Candidate," ,The Mississippi Valley Historical Review
XLIX (June, 1962), PP• 67-8.
Zrul.1, op,

cit.,

P• 121.
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of the farmer.3 Twice, Lemke resorted to organized third party action.
In 1922, he filed as a candidate for governor to aid in the election
to the United States Senate of his close friend and political confidant,
Lynn Frazier and in 1925 he Op!JOSed Gerald P. Nye's bid for re
election to the Senate. Although neither attempt was successful,
these experiences did not daDu?.ge Lemke's career and left him more
amenable • to third party action in the future.4
With the onset of the depression,Lemke again became active in
politics. The desperate conditions of the Western farmers prompted
him. to campaign for the House of Representatives in 1932. lie
promulgated a two-part program to change the bankruptcy laws as they
applied to farmers and to re-finance farm mortgage indebtedness.
By the first measure, farmers compelled to go through bankruptcy.
could remain on their farms, scale down their debts, and repay the
balance in relatively small amounts. The second measure would penni.t
the farmer to re-finance his debts by borrowing from the Federal
government and to increase the amound of money in circulation by

the issuance of Federal Reserve notes for this purpose.5 The program

later became famous as the Frazier-Lemke .tlill.
Lemke's ideas gained wide support among farmer organizations
and the Republican machine within North Dakota. This new-found
support made him a critical figure in the eyes of the state Democratic
party. Frarutlin Roosevelt faced his first major test in the North
3Blackorby,
op, cit., P• 69.
4,D!a• .
5
.!lli,., PP• 70-71.

Dakota presidential primary and his advisers thought it vise to enlist
Lemke's support if possible. Fred McLean, manager of Roosevelt's
campaign in the state, arranged an interview between the two men at
Hyde Park. Although Roosevelt made no actual commitments, Lemke,
acting on the general assurances he received, returned to North Dakota
and informed the Non-Partisan League and the Farmers' Union that
Roosevelt would support the bankruptcy and farm re-financing measures.
. North Dakota. 6
Ri s assurances were instrumental in Roosevelt's victory.in
Victorioue_in his own campaign, Lemke went to Washington in 1933
secure in the feeling that he would be instrwnental in the preparation
of the Administration farm program. He soon found out, however, that
farm legislation would originate in an inner circle of presidential
advisers and that successful enactment of his program would depend
less upon his congressional influence than upon the hearings he could
gain from presidential intimates. Unfortunately, they showed scant
regard for his solution to the farm problem.7
When it became impossible to influence Roosevelt or his immediate
agricultural advisers through personal pressure, Lemke sought other
means. He delivered speeches over a nation-wide radio network spon
sored by the Farmers 9 Union, he lobbied and cajoled other legislators,
and sought support from other national groups, including Father
Coughlin. Ris efforts were successful for in June, 19:54, Congress

·a

passed his ba:okruptct, measure.
6Ibid-.
7
1l!!!l., P• 72.
8
Schlesinger, The Politics

ot Upheayal,

P• 280.
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North Dakota voters returned Lemke to the House in 1934 congressional
elections. During the campaign, he promised to work for the passfi89
of the second pbase of his controversial program. He wall, however,
doomed to disappointment.

Late in 1934, the Supreme Court declared

, the bankruptcy law unconstitutional, and Lemke was forced to devote
most of 1935 to its revision.

By � of 19:,6, he. aucceeded in bringi.Dc
9
the farm mor�gage refinancing bill to the floor ot the House. The
failure of the bill has already been recounted. Lemke now faced a
decision.
The immediate result of the defeat was to turn Lemke from "a
mere critic and half-concealed opponent" of.Roosevelt into an open
and implacable enemy who was thoroughly convinced that the solution
to the farmers' problems could not be attained within the framework
of either major party. To Lemke, the enactment of his agricultural
reforms meant more than any political allegiance. As his past career
demonstrated, he was ,rilling to become associated with any movement
which promised success. Possible association with Father Coughlin
appeared to be a most promising outlet.
Coughlin and Lemke had become acquainted in late 1932 when the
, Congressman wrote the priest commending him on his inflationary

.

10

proposals and soliciting his support for the farm refinancing measure.
Coughlin considered. this plan the obvious solution to the farmers;
woes and agitated for its passage. The defeat of the Frazier-Lemke
B£D, stirred both men to action.

9Ibid.,
P• 554.
10 la or
B ok b7, op,

cit.,

P•

75.
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In early June, 1936, Father Coughlin prepared for possible third
party action, by naming forty-eight state chairmen tor the National
Union for Social Justice. He appointed Lemke in North Dakota.
Furthermore, the priest financed a careful study of the election laws
in each state.

In a letter dated June

a,

Coughlin informed his state

chairman that "in due time telegrama will be sent you containing . • •
.

the names ot the candidates tor president and vice-president."

11

All that the priest need�d now vu a candidate. He sought a Republican who was dissatisfied with the party standard bearer, Landon,
politically secure in his home state,and thoroughly opposed to
Roosevelt.

Lemke admirably filled all requirements.

The North Dakotan was more than amenable to third party action.
Hie past experiences with it, while not placing him in office, had
brought success in the broad.er framework of translating his ideas
into action.
any different.

There is no evidence that he considered this situation
Furthermore, the funds and publicity channels which

Coughlin possessed were very alluring. Here lq an opportunity for
Lemke to reach the people, secure support for his policies, and to even
the score with Roosevelt.

As previously mentioned, �emke declared

his candidacy on June 19.
Both Coughlin and Lemke followed a st-r1k1ngly similar path in
their alienation from the New Deal. Both men made a contribution,
albeit small, to Roosevelt's 1932 victory.

Both had been led to

believe that they would be consulted in the fomation of policy and

ll..o,a.
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both had seen their pet schemes rejected. Furthermore, they agreed
upon financial, agricultural, and foreign policy matters. No other
candidate was as admirably suited to Coughlin's Unionfarty as the
one he chose.
While the presidential candidate was the best available, the man
nominated for the vice-presidency was a woeful no�ntity� Thomas
. Charles O'Brien was an obscure Massachusetts politician. After working
his wa;y through Harvard Law School as a railwq baggage man, he was
elected district attorney for Suffolk County. He also served as the
12
regular cowisel for the Brotherhood of Railwa;y Trainmen.
With
nothi.Dg more to recommend him as a national personality, it ia
difficult to avoid the conclusion that he was chosen because he was
an Irish Catholic trom an important Eastern state.

. _

The formation of the Union .Barty platform was one of the rare

J

occasions when all the members of the coalition co-operated. Lemke,
Coughlin, Francis P. Keelon editor of the pro-Coughlin
J
Brooklyn Tablet and Martin Sweeney, Coughlinite congressman from

0' Brien,

Cleveland, met at Great Bartington, Massachusetts on June 21. On
the 23,· Dr. Townsend, Gerald L.K.Smith and Lemke held a conference.
Finally, Lemke and O'Brien went to Royal Oak to confer further with
the priest. The platform was published in the July 6 issue of
1
Social Justice. 3
14
was extremely vague and generalized.
The Union Party Platform
14rui.1, op, cit., P• 128.
13
Blackorby, op, cit., P• 76, Bey Torte Times, Jun• 24, 19:,6,
Social Justice, July 6, 19:,6.
14 ·
See Appendix II
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Its fifteen pl� represent nothing more than a condensation of
Coughlin's Sixteen Principles of Social Justice. The currency question
dominated it. Planks two and thi-e•·-'Mdvanoed- 1.p1·d•Jto enact 'Coughl-!Ji'a
monetary theories. Lemke's agricultural program received full and
explicit endorsement in plank five. The other members of the Union
did not, however, fare as well. Instead of endorsing the Townsend
P lan, the platform simply requested in the sixth plank "reasonable
and decent security for the aged." The Share-Our-Wealth movement was
indirectly considered in plank fourteen which recommended "a limita
tion upon the net income ot. any one individual in� one year."
Aside from Coughlin's monetary provisions, it gave no e�planation
concerning the implementation of these goals. Finally, the platform
expressed avowedly isolationistic sentiments with plank one announcing
that America must be "self-contained and self-sustained." The
platform as a whole shon close connection with Populism. Maey of

1
its plal'.iks were similar to those of the Populist platforms of the 1890's.5
With candidates, a platform, and a goal, the Union Party now
needed only support. Two groups which were �ital to success__;the
other independent political organizations and the national press
proved almost wholly opposed. ·other political movements wasted little
time in making their feelings known. Thomas Amlie, House leader of
the Wisconsin Progressives, stated that the Coughlin United Front
could accomplish little Yitbout the support of labor, whose absence

,·

was noticeably apparent in the Union Party. Paul Kvale, Farmer15

Mason,

op, cit.,

P• l:,l.
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Labor party representative from Mimlesota, called the movement "ill
timed" and its organization "impracticable." Delegates to the
convention of the Farm Holidq Association fought the issue of

\

endorsing Lemke to a stalemate. Finally, four state presidents, who \
were loyal to the North Dakotan, seceded to form a "real farmers'
organization." They were led by Representative Usher L. Burdick of
North Dakota who was Lemke's campaign manager. Earl Browder,
American Communist party leader, charged that "the self-styled
'Union Party' secretly manufactured in the laboratory of Coughlin
and

Lemke and sprung upon the world full-grown, bears all the earmarks

of a Hearst-Landon-Liberty League intrigue." Finally, Norman Thomas,
perennial Socialist party presidential. candidate, commented that
"Two and a half rival messiahs plus one ambitious politician plus
a platform which reminds me of the early efforts of Hitler to be

radical do not make a very strong party ••• "

16

The organization

could hope for little assi�tance from that sector.
Newspaper and periodical. comment on the new party was universally
critical.; not a single major paper supported Lemke. The New York
Herald Tribune called th� party a "serious menace" to the administ
ration

and

predicted that it would cost the Democrats more than the

Republicans. The Philadelphia Bulletin conceded that the party might
play a prominent role but maintained. that Coughlin overshadowed Lemke.
The New Republic was not opposed to the party platform but doubted
whether Coughlin and his associates would be able to implement it
16

Vices: Left of Center Politics in
Donald R. McCoy,
University
of Kansas Press, 1958, PP• 141,
a
(Lawrencei
the New Deal Er
145-�6.

&9
vithout recourse to f"ascism.

The Nation, correctly repognizing

Roosevelt's popularity as the major issue in the campaign, stated
that Lemke's candidacy would hurt Landon more than Roosevelt.

It

saw that some anti-Roosevelt voters would now go to the North Dakota

.

congressman rather than the Kansas governor. 17

Whatever favorable

campaign coverage the Union Party received, it would have to come from
its own outlets for the national press made it obvious that it was
firmly opposed to Lemke and Compaey.
Lemke attempted to organize the party into a functioning unit.
He chose Burdick as campaign manager and John Nystul, former Non-Partisan
League leader, as national chairman. They chose Chicago as the site
of the national head.quarters; unfortunately it was unable to begin·
operation until September.

The party staff was comprised largely

of Lemke followers from North Dakota.

They immediately sought to

place the Union ticket on the ballot in as� states as possible.
This proved to be an exceedingly difficult problem.

Attorneys,

provided by Coughlin, assisted party organizers with complete legal
·
1
ad.vice gained from the priest's stuczy of state election laws. 8 The
intricacies of these laws, however, made their task difficult.

In some

states, the title "Union Party" was pre-empted by foresighted Democrats
while in others the petitions which the party filed were carefully inspect
ed by the established office-holders hoping to find enough incorrect
signatures to invalidate them. Ai.so, because of its late formation,

17
Tu11,

op, cit••

• 18Blaclcor\17,

PP• 131-32.

op, cit.,

P• 78. -
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it could not get on the ballot in several states. Coughlin finall7
succeeded in getting the party on the ballot in thirty-aµ states.

In

only thirty of them, however, could he use the name Union P,arty. In
Michigan it had to appear as the "Third Party," in Pennsylvania as
the "Royal Oak Party", in Illinois as the "Union Progressive Party",
in New Jersey as the "National Union for Social Justice Party", in
'. Oregon as the "Independent Union Party" and in South Dakota as the
"Independent Party".

19

By far, the most serious outcome of this

problem was the inability of the party to appear on the ballot in
the pivotal states of New York, California, and Louisiana.
The campaign proved to be a strenuous one. Lemke traveled some
thrity thousand miles by air. The general theme of his campaign
was an attack upon "concentrated wealth that had impoverished.the
20
masses."
He repeated it at meetings of farm groups and at state
fairs thro\l&hout the Midwestern agricultural region. He mounted a
continuing attack against the New Deal and denounced the Agricultural
Adjustment Mrn1n1stration as "a national lunacy" and Secretary of
Agriculture Henry Wallace as the "greatest vandal in history."
Altho\l&h this approach left some of his �ences unreceptive, he
maintained it thro\l8hout the campaign. He professed to believe that
the Union party would be the pivotal factor in the election and
further announced that he was an optimist who subscribed to James
Russell Lowell's theory that "truth was on the scaffold and wrong
upon the throne," but that "an enlightened public opinion" would
19See Appendix III.
20BlackorbJ,
9P• cit., P• 78.
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produce victory for "decency and righteousness." 21
ln mid�ctober, Lemlce began a Western tour which was supposed to
end in California.

The depleted nature of party finances is shown by

his request that the national headquarters instigate a radio campaign
for one dollar contributions to finance the project. The request met
with meager success. jjy the end of the campaign, Lemke had spent
22
$7,000 of his own funds, much of which had been borrowed.
Following his return from the West, Lemke concentrated his efforts·
on the Midwestern agricultural areas.

He stepped up his attacks on

adm1ni�tration farm policy and continued advocating his own refinancing
and farm-mortg889 formula. There was little restraint in his criticism.
He alleged that the ,Ajministration was "contim1ing this insane policy
in the midst of hunger, misery, wunt and raga • • • There is over
production of just one thing, and that is an overproduction or
2
ignorance." 3 Throughout. this agricultural heartland, he promised
to put an end to eviction for debt.
Lemke had pl�ed it safe and filed for re-election to the House
from his North Dakota district.· .As November 4 drew near, it became
increasingly obvious that ohly a miracle could produce a Union Party
victory. He returned to North Dakota to assure his coogressional re
election. By this time, he had changed his tack, predicting that the
election would be so close that it y0uld be decided by the House of
Representatives. He told his constituents that he wanted "to be there
21Ibid.

22Ibid.,
P• 79.
2

1in York Times,

October 28, 1936.
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to help elect Dij'Self president" and al.so urged'them to support· the

state's other Representative, Usher Burdick. He commented, "When this
election is thrown into the House I also want him there to help elect
2
the Union Party candidates: 4 By election dq, .Lemke was as assured
of re-election in North Dakota as he was of defeat in the presidential
election.
Lemke had waged a campaign typical of a candidate attempting to
unseat an incumbent. He had limited his major appearances to agricul
tural areas where his support was most likely to be concentrated.
Although he had castigated the Administration and its farm policy,
he did not allow personalities to enter the picture and he provided
alteniate proposals for those policies he criticized.

His.mentor,

Father Coughlin, however, waged a much less rational campaign.
The priest undertook the campaign with all the fervor of a
religious crusade. He held rallies in every major city of the East
and Midwest.

His controlling hand was ever evident in the Social

Justice articles, and,_ early in September, he returned to the air for
weekly broadcasts.

The campaign for control of Congress was forgotten;

Coughlin's single aim became the defeat of Roosevelt.
The priest officially opened his campaign on July 4 with a rally

--

in Brockton, Massachusetts. He attacked the .fresident for "out-

-

Hoovering Hoover" by burdening the nation with a 135,CXX>,000,000

public- debt. 25""

Coughlin followed this speech with-. whirlwind tour

2 la or ,
4-iJ ck by op, cit., P• 79°
25
·
Bex 1ork Times, July 5, 1936.

1,
of the East. He conferred with National Union for Social Justice
officials in Trenton, Nev Jersey, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, ·and
then returned to the Midwest for a meeting in Chicago. At all of
these gatherings, he scored the administration and urged his follovere
.
26
to redouble their efforts on behalf of Lemke.
One of the priest's early triumphs came at the national convention
of the ToVDSendites. The Doctor's followers met in Cleveland from
July 16 to July 20. The movement's leadership was bitterly divided
over the question of endorsing Lemke.

Coughlin endeavored to influence

the membership with a virulent :harAn&'Ue' against the ]resident. Appearinc
at his oratorical best, he held the audience spellbound. He reminded
the delegates that their beloved Doctor had alread1' endorsed Lemke and
assured them they would not be forced to surrender their identity if
they supported the Union candidate. At the climax of his oration,
Coughlin commanded all those who supported Lemke to rise. The entire
audience complied. Overcome by his own spellbinding oratory, the
priest tore off his coat and Roman collar then b,ysterically denounced
Roosevelt as "the great betrqer and liar" for not having fulfilled
his promise to reform the monetary system. He continued by shouting
that the initials F.D.R. should stand for "Franklin Double-crossing

Roosevelt." 27 Although he later apologized that he had become "carried

avq by the heat of the moment", he had seriously hampered his chances
of success.
i>espite his oratorical triumph, Coughlin did not achieve his main

26l!!a•, July 7-ll, 19'6.

271R,li.,. July 17, 19'6.
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aim. The convention never formally endorsed Lemke as its presidential
candidate. Doctor Townsend, however, continued to campaign for him
until the election •
. The "liar" speech also elicited a response from the Democratic
,

Party Which had been strangely silent up to that time. Democratic
national chairman, Jamee Farley, expressed the opinion that the priest
had injured himself more than ·aeyone else by his violent attack on
the President, and he wrote off the Union Party as an insignificant
28
issue in the campaign.
Furthermore, Roosevelt, in a private letter
to 'I/ice-president Garner, written at approximately the same time,
.commented that "curiously itnough, I don't think the Lemke ticket will
29
cut into our vote any more than it will into the Republican vote."
Although neither knew it at the time, their predictions were to prove
absolutely correct.
Oblivious to the furor he had created, the priest continued his
campaign with whistle stop speeches in the North and East-Central
sections of the nation.

On

July 26, he spoke before 15,000 farmers at

Harrison, North Dakota and ad.vised them to repudiate their debts if
Lemke were defeated. He neatly side-stepped a charge of fiscal
irresponsibility when later questioned by stating that he

had

been

incorrectly quoted due to a malfunctioning public ad.dress system. What
he had actually said was that farmers would have no choice but
repudiation unless aid were extended to them.30

29Elliott.Rooeevelt (ed.), Franklin D, Rooseyelt--His Personal
vol. l (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950),
Letters, 1928-1945,
. ..
P• 602.

30N
ew Io� T�s, July ZT-28, 19:,6.
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As the campaign progressed Coughlin'& addresses grew increasingly
vitriolic. He descended upon Massachusetts in the first week of

-

August. On the- first, he delivered an ad.dress at Worcester which

· --

indicted the Republican candidate. He called Landon a "menace" and
predicted a revolution if the Kansas governor. were elected. On the

- -

-

following day at New Bedford, he returned to form and again attacked
the President. He labeled Roosevelt a communist and announced "as I
was instrumental in removing Herbert Hoover from the White House, so
help me God, I will be instrumental in taking a communist out of the
chair once occupied by Washington.• :,i
The high-point of the campaign for Coughlin was the National
Union for Social Justice convention held in Cleveland from the-l3
to the 16 of August. The National Union chapters sent 10,000 official
delegates to represent a membership estimated at 6,000,000. The
atmosphere resembled that of a religious revival more than a political
gathering. Coughlin was nnao1nously elected Union president and Lemke
was nnan1roously endorsed as presidential candidate. The_,pr�estc�prapared the

agenda and arbitrarily decided who would be allowed to speak. It

was obvious that Coughlin was their messiah and the delegates came
prepared to humbly obey his desires.
The only discordant note at the convention was grand marshal:
Walter P. Davia' proclamation that Doctor Townsend and Reverend Smith
would be allowed to speak "over my dead body." The priest, demonstrating

- '

I

hie power, quickly over-ruled him and both men were pemitted to speak,
31Ibid., jugust :,, 1936.
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but, only after the convention had of'ficial.ly adjourned. Both

received cordial receptions but said nothing of real significance. 32
The climax of the gathering was an outdoor rally held at
Cleveland's Municipal Stadium on Sundq afternoon. It was attended
by a highly partisan crowd of' 42,000. Coughlin delivered the main
address in which he promised to continue his fight for monetary reform
and deplored the lack of "Christian charity" in the operation of the

government. Again carried awq by the enthusiasm of his audience,
he made what vas perhaps the most rash promise of his career. He
told his followers that "If I don't deliver 9,000,000 votes for William
Lel.'"'ce, I'm through with radio forever." 33 This promise proved very
difficult to keep after November 4.
As almost an anti-climax, Lemke and O'Brien spoke following
Co'U8iu1n. The North Dakotan exuded optimism, openly predicting victory
for the Union �,arty, "We are going to win. The Union Party's bid
for the presidency and the vice-presidency of the United States will
not be a campaign of defeatism." O'Brien, endeavoring to maintain the
image of a spokesman for labor, attacked A.F. of' L. president Green
for his opposition to the Frazie�Lemke bill and prop.hesied that the
majority of the labor vote would reject Green's leadership and support
4
the Union Pa.rty o 3 Thus ended what has been labeled "the emotional
high-water mark of' American political history." 35
32.ruii, op, cit., p. 140.
33New York Times, August 18, 1936.

�iea.
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Coughlin's campaign activities following the convention grew
increasingly wilder and more illogical. At Providence, Rhode Island,
he said that, if Hoover had been re-elected, "there would be more
bullet holes in the White House than you could count with an adding
machine."

In

Boston, he declared "Every international banker has

communistic tendencies."

In

Nev York, he pronounced the choice between

Roosevelt and Landon as one "between carbolic acid and rat poison."
In

Cinc�ti, he called the fresident "anti�d."

categorized Roosevelt's advisers

as

In

Des Moines;he

"Hull, the internationalist and

number one communist. Then comes Ma Perkins, Ickes, Morgenthau,
Tu&Well, Mordecai Ezekiel-all communists." Finally, in Cleveland,
he indicted Roosevelt as a "scab president" leading a "scab

&.l'ley'"

(�e V.P.A.). 36 Undoubtedly, this language worried and alienated

many people. It cost the Union.�ty precious votes which it could
ill afford to lose.
Coughlin held two major rallies following the National Union
convention. At both of them he continued his attacks upon the
Roosevelt administration to the cheers of his loyal adherents. On
�eptember 6, the priest held a mammouth outdoor meeting at Chicago's
Riverview Park. It was attended by a crowd of over 80,000 who paid
fifty cents admission for the benefit of the Union �arti• coffers.

In

his speech, Coughlin gave evidence of his powers of literary analogy
when he compared the Nev Deal With a "slick" magazine&

36schlesinger,

October�. 19'6.

The Politics of Upheaval, p. 629, New York Times,
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Mr. Roosevelt is the beautiful cover on the New Deal
magazine. But what do we find when we open it? The
first article is by Henry Morgenthau, the lover ot
international bankers. The second article is by
Rexie Tugwell, the communist and handshaker with
Russia. The third article is by Mordecai Ezekiel,
the modern Margaret Sa.Il8er of the pigs. The
· fourth article is by Henry "Plow Me Down" Wallace,
• • • last but not least, we have "Three-Finger"
Jim Farl�y. Postmaster General, chairman of the
state committee, of the national committeeThree Fingers-one .for each pie. YI
The priest continued his attack at Brooklyn's Ebbetta Field on
September 13. Here, 22,000 paid to hear him indict the "pagan
industrial system of the United States." He scornfully denounced
the entire gamut of New Deal labor legislation. Then, for a moment,
he departed from his attack on the administration to accuse David
Dubinsky, president of the International Ladies Garment Workers'
Union, of raising $5,000 for the communist-sponsored Loyalists in
Spain, strongly implying that Dubinsky was a communist. 38

During the last month of the campaign, Coughlin's speeches
contained nothing new. He continued to concentrate his efforts on
indicting the Roosevelt edrn1o1etration for failing to relieve the
depression through monetary reform and for flirting with communism.
His last three addresses, delivered in Nev York,. Scranton, and Newark,
followed the established pattern. In the first, he declared that
•a vote for Roosevelt is a vote for 273,000 socialists and David
Dubinsky and 78,000 communists who sent funds to Spain to massacre
helpless nuns and priests." At Scranton, he referred to Roosevelt as
Y/New York Times, September 7, 1936.
38.Illi., Sept•ber 14, 1936.
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"the upstart president" and the "reviver of the divine right theoryr I then
pronounced the New Deal "more vicious than the Old Deal." Finally,
appearing at Newark, Coughlin told the audience that there would be
20,000,000 wiemployed it Roosevelt were re-elected. 39
Along with its external problems, internal disharmoey plagued
the Union party throughout the campaign. Townsei;id and Smith never
really devoted their full energy to the campaign and Coughlin did not
want to share the spotlight vith them. Al though he had been permitted

to _speak at the Townsend convention, he was reluctant to allow his
supposed partners the same courtesy at his.

When he was questioned

about a proposed national tour with his two "partners", the priest
snapped "Why should they tag me around?" 40 When it became obvious
that the Union ticket would not appear on the California ballot,
TolfDSend advised his followers to vote for Landon. When Smith
announced, on October 18, that he planned to found a new nationalist
movement designed to "seize the government of the United States",
Townsend immediately disavowed him by saying "I am against fascism;
it is un-American and smacks of the dictator-like policies of the
4
New Deal." 1 Lemke followed Townsend's lead but Coughlin remained
silent. The final collapse of this preposterous coalition fulfilled
a prophesy Roosevelt made to former Wilson adiisc,Colonel House,
eighteen months earlier. "When it comes to a show-down, these fellows
39Ibid., October 30, November l,2, 19'6.
40le!!i·, August 14, 1936.
41�., October 19, 19'6.
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cannot all lie in the same bed and will fight among themselves with
absolute certainty." 42
Coughlin unfortunately allowed Social Justice to saddle Lemke
with the campaign nickname "Liberty Bell Bill." Almost every major
party representative who condescended to take notice of the Union
Party candidate mentioned that the Liberty Bell was cracked and
intimated that so, perhaps, was Lemke.4:, This error detracted from
his already weak public image.
Coughlin's relationship with Lemke was by no means an ideal one.
The priest waged essentially a negative campaign, attacking Roosevelt
at every chance. His mention of the North Dakotan in his speeches
often appeared as almost an afterthought. Social Justice showed where
its loyalties 1� by placing a much greater emphasis on the priest
than on the candidate. Finally, Coughlin demonstrated that he was
the real director of the party when he summarily replaced Lemke on
a nation-wide radio broadcast on the eve of the election.44
Two external forces aided in the frustration of the Union Party.
The Catholic Church opposed Coughlin's rantings, and labor's NonPartisan League in conjunction with the Progressive National Committee
campaigned to assure Roosevelt's re-election. Both forces were
extremely influential in alienating large blocks of voters.
Throughout his controversial career, Coughlin had stirred up
42sohlesinger, The Politics of Upheaval, p. 6,0.
4�cCoy, op, cit., P• 149.'
44:tiey York Times,.Bovember 4, 1936.
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protest within the Church� Various eminent prelates had opposed his
political broadcasts since his first attack upon Hoover.

His immediate

superviser, Bishop Gallagher of De�roit approved of his actions so he
was not affected by their criticism..

During the election campaign, his

intemperate utterances elicited a mild rebuke from Gallagher and,
more importantly, sufficiently vociferous and wide-spread censure
from high Church figures to materially affect the average Catholic voter.
The "liar" speech delivered at the Townsend convention had forced
Bishop Gallagher to discipline his stol'ID¥ subordinate.
Coughlin released an apology to the President.

On July 23,

It was primarily

mottvated by the Bishop's request that the offensive language be
toned down. Gallagher assured reporte11J, however, that in the main
". • • he [Coughlin) is working along the right path and he has my
support." 45 This was followed by a series of' important clerical
censures.
Following the apology, Coughlin continued to heap abuse upon the
Roosevelt administration. In the first week of September, the Vatican
nenpaper Osservatore Romano rebuked the priest for hie violent
criticism. The paper said:
An orator who inveighs against persons who represent the
supreme social authorities with the evident danger of shaking
the respect that the people owe to these authorities, sins
against the elementary proprieties. The impropriety is greater
as well as more evident when he who speaks is a priest. 46
The New York Times, the following dq, stated that "High Vatican
circles" stressed that the rebuke was not intended as a blanket
45
1.lw\·, July 29, 1936.
46oss
eryatore Rom,oo, September 2, 1936 quoted in Tull,
P• 143.

op, cit.,

82
disapproval of Coughlin's activities. Actually, they said, Rome
enthusiastically approved of his preaching the social encycliC41s�.1.,but
was disturbed that his attack upon Roosevelt might undermine respect
for all authority and lead to a situation similar to the one existing
in spa1n. 47

Both Coughlin and Gallagher emphatically denied that the
Osservatore Romano article was the official opinion of the Vatican,
Coughlin'& subsequent speeches support their allegation that the rebuke
was not an official censure. The actual relationship of the newspaper
to the Pope is confusing. It is definitely not the official voice ot
thE Church yet, it is generally regarded as reflecting Vatican
policy on current issues. Most Americans, however, assume that the
paper's articles are official pronouncements so the effect on
Cougblin'a voter appeal among Catholics was unfavorable.
The month of October proved especially frustrating for the
Royal Oak orator. In a radio broadcast financed by the Democratic
National Committee and delivered on the eighth, Monsignor John A.
Ryan, generally regarded aa the leading scholarly proponent of
C•tholic social dogma in the nation, attacked Coughlin. He denied
all of the major charges which Coughlin.had leveled at the administra
tion during the campaign. He labeled Coughlin's accusation of
communism against the .Eresident as "ugly, cowardly, and flagrant
calumnies." He continued by s�ing "the charge of communism directed
at President Roosevelt is the silliest, falsest, most cruel, and most

x,x York Times. Sept•ber :,, 19:,6.
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unjust accusation ever made against a president in all the years of
American history." He also defended David Dubi.nsk;y, Sidney Hillman,
Rexford Tugwell, and Felix Frankfurter, men Coughlin had accused of
possessing communist leanings. He characterized the New Deal program as
· "mild installments

of too long del�ed social justice.• He scored

Coughlin's monetary theories as "90 per cent incorrect" and closed by
advising workers to support Roosevelt as the best means to improve
their lot. 48
A week before this broadcast, Rome announced that Cardinal
Eugenio Pacelli, Papal Secretary or State (and later Pius XII) was
going :O undertake an extensive tour of the United States. In the

,

communique no reason vas advanced for his visit. The American press
quickly jumped to the conclusion that he was coming to investigate
the political activities of Father Coughlin. 49
Pacelli arrived on October 8, and remained for three weeks.
During his stq, he refused to answer any questions concerning
Coughlin. Meanwhile, American papers continued to be filled with
rumors concerning the impending crackdown on the priest. To date,
the Vatican has never revealed the actual purpose of the Pacelli
visit.

Its timing, however, in the midst of the presidential campaign

lends credulity to the theory that he came to observe Coughlin.
Whatever the actual reason, his presence served to further alienate
C•tholic voters and weaken CougbJ1n'a appeal.
48.llli., October 9, 1936.
49..D...!l., October 2, 1936.
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These events all weakened Coughlin's appeal among the Catholic
voters. The activities of the national Progressive organizations
helped to limit the support he received from the independent voters.
Labor's Non-Partisan League, founded in April, 19'6, by George L. Berry,
president of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers' Union and John L. Levis,
president of the United Mine Workers sought to become "an inetnunentality
0
of the furtherance of liberalism. in the United States." 5 The League
pledged itself to co-operate with progressives to gain common goals.
lt was to be:
A propaganda league which continued to adhere to Gompers'
dictum "rewt.rd your friends, punish your enemies", but
did it no loll89r through platonic words and nice pronounce
ments but through a well oiled and organized political
machine. 5l
The organization sponsored political rallies, radio broadcasts,
circular and pamphlet publications, and speakers bureaus. There is
little doubt that this organization, by aiding in effectively
marshaling the labor vote behind Roosevelt, contributed significantly
to weakening whatever appeal the Union Party might have held for the
working man.
Another important organization which opposed Lemke was the
Progressive National Committee. This group was formed in Chicago in
September, 1935. Its avowed purpose was to deliver the nation's
independent vote to Roosevelt in 19'6. A partial list of the
committee's membership- indicates iia diversified appeal: Representative
50McCoy, o
p, cit., P• 152.
Sl
�., P• 153.

I
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Thomas Amlie, Farmer-Labor Governor Elmer Benson of Minnesota,
Senators Hugo .Black and Edward Costigan, Sidney HilJ roan, Wisconsin
Progressives Robert and Phillip LaFollette, New York Ma_yor Fiorello
LaGuardia, John L. Lewis, and Washington Progressive Lewis Schwellen
bach.52

The organization proclaimed its solid support of the President's
campaign, and issued a statement which read in part:
Political realignment cannot be made to order. Reactionaries
• • • hope to win by dividing progressives. An unbiased
examination of the field makes it unmistakably clear that
the next president • • • will be Roosevelt or Landon. In;
thi� campaign there' is therefore only one-choice for
American Progressives. 5J
The committee ob-operated closely with Labor's Non-Partisan League·
in sponsoring radio programs, holding rallies and distributing
literature. Their efforts were rewarded in November when the inde
pendent bote was cast almost totally for Roosevelt.
The combined force of �temal inconsistencies, gross
political blunders, organized and efficient opposition and inopportune
· timing proved too powerful for the Union Party to overcome. By early
fall, there was little doubt left concerning the outcome of the election.
The vote cast on November 4, was one of the most lopsided ever
recorded in American history. Roosevelt garnered over 60 per cent of
the popular vote, while in the electoral college he carried all the
states save Maine and Vermont, thus fulfilling Jim Farley's prediction.
For the Union Party, the eiection was a catastrophe. It received

52.D.a. , P• 154.
53�., PP• 154-55.
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a mere 882,479 votes, only about 2 per cent of the total cast. A
Nev York Times reporter recorded the priest's reaction.

"On election

night when the returns began coming in Coughlin sat in his Royal
Oak office stunned, tea.rs streaming down his cheeks.

It was beyond

comprehension." 54 Furthermore, the party elected no congressional
candidates as Unionists per se; it had been thoroughly rebuked.

What Coughlin had law;i.ched to repudiate Roosevelt bacld'ireda he
helped unite the labor and indep�ndent vote behine the .Bresident and
the defeat served notice that the .American people desired no part of
the things tor which the "unholy trinit,• stood.

5
�u York Times, lloTaber 8, 19:,6.

VII
Coughlin and _Lemke ·. tried to- lay 'the foundation of a strong
third party organization in 1936.

They propa.bly did not expect to

vin, but they did hope to make a respectable showing. Why they utterly
failed to achieve their goal, a large enough following to insure the
Union Party a major role in the 1940 campaign, has been suggested,
but other factors should be weighed·too.
The causes of the defeat can be grouped into four general
categories. The major reason was Coughlin's failure to comprehend the
primary issue of the campaign.

It was the tremendous personal

popularity of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

The priest greatly aided the .·

P,resident by his_illogical and intemperate attacks. Crowds came to
listen and oftentimes cheer but on election�. they overwhA)mingly_
endorsed Roosevelt.
The internal weaknesses of the party contributed in large measure

j

to its defeat. The Union "trinity" bad never been a close-knit
group and before the campaign ended it was split asunder. Al.so, their
presidential candidate did not possess the urbanity and polish that
Americans have come to expect in their presidents. Lemke has been
dea�ribed as "A skinny little glJj. with a puckering squint, of a smile,
1
and a casting director would type him for a hick." His studied
"hayseed" appearance might have aided him with the Western agricultural..i.sts but nationally it weakened his appeal. The religious inconsis1vestbrook Pegler in the San Francisco Call Bulletin, August 9, 1948
quoted in Blackorby, op, cit., P• 1,.
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tencies within the party alienated many people.

Fundamentalists,

especially in the Midwest, cast a jaundiced eye upon the influence
of a Catholic priest and Eastern Catholics disliked Coughlin's
association with a Fullldamentalist clergyman and Ku Klux Klan advocate.
Money and political patronage issues also weakened the party.

It

possessed no local or state organization and the national one was
rudimentary at best.

The party, therefore, could not hope to attract

a following with promises of post-election patronage • .Furthermore,
the exhaustive campaigning which is an integral part of a national
election is expensive. The Union party simply could not match the
two major parties in the campaign !'war chest."
The external factors contributing to the defeat were as important
as the internal ones.

A moat serious limitation was the inability

✓

of the party ticket to appear on the ballot of such pivotal states ·as
California, Louisiana and Nev York. The first, home of the Townsend
movement, cost them heavily.

The second, base of the Share-Our-Wealth

program, had been �heir main hope for a strong .Southern shoving.
New York had demonstrated several times that Coughlin possessed a
large, loyal following there.

Had these states been able to voice

their opinions, political experts feel that the Union party vote might
have.approached 3,000,000. The national press helped to weaken the
popular appeal of the party.

It was solidly opposed to the Union

and emphasized the unfavorable side of Lemke's background while
constantly endeavoring to undermine Coughlin's popularity.

In fact,

· not a single major publication took a f'avorable view of the third party.
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Finally, the external factor which moet injured the party was its lack
of co-operation with other dissident groups. The liberal, progressive
fanner and labor organizations recognized that the surest wa;y to
obtain their goals was by supporting the Nev Deal. The Progressive
National Committee and labor's Non-Partisan League went so far as to
endorse Roosevelt and campaign actively for his_re-election. Without
the support of the independent vote, Coughlin's hope for success never
materialized.·
A final reason for the defeat ie inherent in the American political
tradition. Voters are not wont to "waste" their ballot on third
party candidates. History records that they� theoretically approve

of the party's program but when the votes are cast ithe major parties
reap the benefit.
a chance

in 1936.

It is safe to sa;y _that the Union Party never stood

It is now necessary to analyze the sources of Coughlin's support.
Two major studie'3 have been conducted which shed partial light upon
the subject. Samuel Lubell in his Future of American Politics
points out that outside his home state of North Dakota, Lemke received
more than 10 per cent of the vote in only thirty-nine counties. He
continues, "Twenty-one of these counties are more than 50 per cent
Catholic.

In twenty-:-eight of these thirty-nine counties the predominant
''2

nationality element is German. This helps to pinpoint the areas in
which religious and ethnic factors were concentrated enough to be of
primary importance. Semour Martin Lipsett, Professor of Sociology
2samue1 Lubell, The Fu.ture of American Politics (Garden City,
Bev Tork: Doubledq and Co,,Inc., reT. ed., 1956), P• 152.
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at the University of California, Berkley, in his ess� "Three Decades
of the Radical Right" analyzes the social basis of Coughl.in's support.
By analyzing three relevant public opinion polls, Professor Lipset
arrived at the conclusions that older people were more inclined to
support the.priest, more men supported him than women, he attracted
the less rather than the more educated and that "Coughlin's mass base
came largely from the urban working class and the poor, particularly

the unemployed and those on relief." 3 With these details in mind,

it is safe to assume that the priest was more effective among those
of his own religion and also those in the nation who were dd.scontented
with their lot, with the economic state of the country and with their
prospects for the future. Appendix three lists by state what can be
considered the hard core of Coughlin 1 s following.
What effect did the defeat have upon the priest's subsequent
career? Coughlin fulfilled his pledge of August 14, 1936, by
departing from radio following the debacle. Had he actually ceased
his public career at this point, he might easily have been remembered
as an. earnest and sincere, if somewhat misguided, phenomenon of the
early depression. He soon returned, however, advocating a radical
break with the .American tradition. He had sincerely believed in
democracy and the electoral process up.to the election of 1936.
The use of the National Union as a para-political pressure group in
3semour Martin Li eet, "Three Decades of the Radical Right",
�
The Radical Right (ed.) Daniel Bell (Garden City, New York: Double�
Anchor Books, 1964), PP• 381-91.
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the�state primaries gives evidence of this.

ln the election, he

submitted his program, which he considered the only logical solution
to the depression, to the electorate. lt was overwhelmingly rejected.
Yet, in the strength of his convictions, he still felt that it was
correct. So, if his theories were correct and the electorate had
r�jected them, in his interpretation, the electorate must have been
wroil8•

If the electorate could be wrong, then the democratic process

must be invalid. Operating under this premise, Coughlin worked out
a detailed plan for a corporate state in America.
This plan was announced on March 13, 1938.

In his regularly

1ohadul•d broadout, entitled "The Corporate S1:ate? Coughlin announoecl
"that some reorganization of the government is necessary." lie then
indicted the existing system by s�i!l8:
My friends, we have witnessed the deterioration of
representative government which no longer represents the
majority of our people but which contents-itself with
protecti!l8 the sanctity of debts and of bonds to the
detriment of 95 per cent of our population�
Under such debased conditions, democracy permitted us
to vote against a party but alv�s forced us to prolong
the life of a system that was sapping our resources,
our liberties and our lives.
Therefore.government has become so misrepresentative,
under the fiction of democracy,· that the dramatic hour
has arrived to reorganize it so that it will be possible
to enjoy the benediction of a real democracy. 4
The priest then proposed a program of "eight specific proposals"
which would "perfect" the governments of counties and of States as
well as the Federal Government." By enumerati!l8 his program it will
4Charles E. Coughlin, Sixteen
o ectures: 1938 Series,
� L93-9
(Detroit& Privately Published, 1938�p.
4 •.
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be possible to see how alienated Coughlin had become from the American
political system.
First, I propose that we abandon the inefficient system
of parties. Instead of having thP. .American voters divided
artificially into Democrats and Republicans and "what-nots,"
I propose to have them divided naturally into groups according
to vocations and professions.
This proposal means that it will be necessary to
change our entire system of electing members to the House
of Representatives • • • for that system I would substitute�:
the system of the corporate state election. This means
that instead of being divided into congressional districts,
citizens would be divided according to their classification
in society • • • Each class of citizens grouped according to
its present calling in life will have a representative in
Congress whose business it will be really to represent that
class • • • Each capitalist will be in hie own class
organized corporaUvelyJ each laborer in his clue like
wise will be organized in a corporation.
Local units of each corporation will form State units;
and State units will form national units, in which both the
capitalists have their organizations and the laborers will
have theirs. From these organizations they will freely select
their own Representatives for Congress.
My second proposal is related to the presidency of the
United States • • • I propose that we abandon the
electoral college and transfer the power of electing the
President of the United States to the House of Representa
tives which House will be composed • • • of members •
elected according to class with each class having its own
Representative.
Instead of creating a dictato�ial President, the House
of Representatives will ,choose a President who is its leader.
He will be chosen either from among their own members or
from outside their members, as they decide.
Thirdly, I propose that we retain the Senate of the
United States with two Senators elected from each State,
one of whom must represent capital and the other labor,
in the wide acceptance of these terms. In one sense,
the Senate will be vested with powers superior to those
of the House of Representatives. I propose that while
the Senate will not be permitted to initiate legislation,

nevertheless, it will be necessary for that body to
sanction all legislation. The Senate will be presided over
by the Vice-President who will .also be Secretary of
Corporations-that is, under the President and the House
· of Representatives, the.Secretary of Corporations will
be the supreme authority over evecy class corporation of
the United States including all the corporations of every
classification of labor, of agri_culture and of capital.
Fourthly, I propose that Congress will abandon the
present Federal System of taxation which has grown burden
some and confiscatocy, and will substitute for it a
system which will levy taxation according to income and
not according to property.
Fif.thly, I propose that Congress will declare a ten year .
moratorium on all Federal bond payments and interest
p�ents, thereby enabling industcy and commerce, labor and
agriculture to husband their resources and profits in this
battle not only against depression but against the bulwarks
of civilization itself.
Sixthly, I propose that Congress and Congress al.one
shall have full control over the spending power of the
Federal Government and forthwith·will exercise its right
to issue and regulate money for the nation.
Seventhly, I propose that it shall be the business of
Congress to safeguard the functioning of the law of
supply and demand • • • so that no child will be hungry or
naked, no father will be needlessly unemployed and no
wage-earner will be paid less than a living annual wage.
And lastly, I propose that Congress, composed of both
the House and the Senate, will be a silent partner in
settling, with a finality, all questions arising between
their
capital and labor which capital and labor,
corporations, do not settle by themselves.

Fugh

Coughlin concluded by stating that "This is a brief outline of
the democratic Corporate State: free from the domination of capital.ism
and party-ism; free from bigotry and racial hatreds." He_ rejoiced
that---his scheme would mean"no more antagonism of. class against class�,

5� •• pp� 95-99.
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and that it would mark: "the end of plutocracy as well as the swan
song of inefficient political party-ism." His final statement possesses
a threatening ring.

"I:r these proposals are in conflict. with so-.

called States' rights, then the hour has arrived for us to declare
ourselves for human rights in preference to States' ·:righta.· 11 • 6
This strange conglomeration of Italian Fascism as envisioned by
Mussoli.Ju; and social justice as promulgated by Pius XI in Quadragesimo
� is filled with internal inconsistencies. That it could be
implemented under the existing constitution, as Coughlin annoWlced,
is highly unlikely. That it would end class conflict is also open
to question; placing the capitalists and the laborers at logger
heads in a legislative assembly would be as apt to increase conflict
as remove it. Furthermore, calling a corporate state democratic is
a contradiction in terms; where one exists there is little chance
of the other.

It is obvious that by 1938 the priest had thoroughly

broken with the democratic-capitalistic system.
Coughlin did not limit himself to theory. By the beginning of
World War II, he had sp9ken at a rally of the German-American Bund
and seemed to be the patron1 of a national crypto-fascist organization,
the Chri&.tian Front. He embraced another tenet of fascism when he
began a campaign of anti-Semitism. Social Justice published the

discredited "Protocols of the Elders of Zion" 7 and his broadcasts

indicted the Jews as being responsible for all the major national
6

Ibid., P• 99.
7A purported account of a Jewish �onspiracy to sieze control of
the world, disproTe� by reputable scholars •

.,

j
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problems. When the government finally silenced Social Justice, in
April, 1942, it was for violation of the sedition law. In the hearing
before Postmaster General Walker, evidence, consisting of quotations
from the magazine, were presented which alleged that every issue
8
since Pearl Harbor had been eeditious. All these activities seemed
to confirm Coughl.in's disillusionment with democracy. A foreshadowing
of his subsequent advocacy of fascism is found in a statement made _in
Der Moines, Iowa, in September, 1936 when the result of the election
was no longer in doubt. He told a journalist that, "•••Democracy
is doomed, this is our last election•••it is fascism or communism.
9
We are at the crossroads••• I take the road to faeci1:JD1."
In concluding, it is perhaps well to allow Coughlin to speak for
himself. In December, 1962 and January, 1963, he broke a two decade
silence by granting inte!Views to the Detroit News and a representative
.

,,,,,

of C.B.S. News. In the first, he stated that "bigotry is passe•••
and is the private pursuit of professional hate peddlers," and also
that the President should not be criticized because "we only have one
lO
president at a time••• and he has to make the decisions."
In the more extensive interview, granted to Bernard Eisman,
Coughlin admitted that:
Well, I suppose I committed an egregious error which I am the
first to admit when I pennitted myself to attack persons.
I could never bring myself to philosophize the morality of
that now. It was a young man's mistake •••
8New York Times, Mq 5, 1942.
9
schlesinger, The Politics of Upheaval, p. 629.
10
petroit Nm Stocy quoted in the Gr@Ad Rapids Press, April 4, 1965.
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In analyzing his career in the depression era Coughlin recalled that,
At times I reconsider many things. First of all, the whole
philosophic structure of what I was trying to do was open
to correction and improvement. No clergyman has business
injecting himself into the practical side of politics • • •
I could have done much better had I been more mature in
my thinking at the time, and I could have accomplished
much more if I had retained the advocacy of my principles.
When questioned concerning his alleged anti-Semitism he replied,
It's quite possible, if not probable that those who
didn't agree with me took the viewpoint that I was
against the men on account of their religion or
their race, which wasn't true.
The priest explained his conception of social justice by sqing:
Well, at that time it was rather nebulous in my mind
a.a in the mind:3 of moBt persona who were attemptiJli
social justice. As I conceive it, it was a new field. • •
it had existed in theory. It had exioted in the
abstract, but very few of us had tried to put it into
practice. Ny concept of social justice at the time
reveals this-to give the underprivileged more oppor
tunities to rise from their poor estate.
In reference to reappraising his past career, Coughlin commented that:
• • • having attained this three score and ten with the
powers of observation that a younger man lacks • • • you
really can reappraise things. No. It's not agonizing at
all • • • I think it's the humilities that an old man
acquires. A young man knows nothing or very little about it.
The final question concerned the circumstances that led to his
·going off the air. The priest responded:
Oh, I prefer not to reavpraise those things or recall them
even, because it would lead me into too many personal
channels. And so let the dead past bury its dead. 11
This exceedingly candid interview serves as the best conclusion
to a stormy career. That Father Charles E. Coughlin was an
interesting and intriguing phenomenon of the depression era cannot

11Bernard Eisman, "Reflections of a Radio Priest," !2£Y§.
Midwest, II (February, 1963), PP• 8-10.

be denied.

His brilliant molding of public opinion via the newest

technological innovation-the radio-contrasts sharply with hie
advocacy of archaic and intrinsically faulty ideas.

Hie ecclesias

tical vocation is at variance with his resort to vituperation and
personal invective.

Where he belongs in the structure of American

political protest has caused considerable controversy. The theory
that he is a link between the Populist protest of the l890's and
the McCarthy-John Birch agitation of the present era has much to
support it. All these groups possess interesting similarities in
their views on foreign affairs, monetary policy, and racism. Also,
much ot their hard-core support comes from the Midwest. Intrigl.Wli
though it mq be, this theory has n�t been proved and only further
investigation can determine its verity. The author can only agree
with the priest in his. comment released to Life Magazine in 1955.
"It was a horrible mistake to enter politics."

Appendix I
Preamble and Principles of the
NATIONAL UNION FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE
Establishing m:, principles upon this preamble, namely, that we
are creatures ot a beneficent God, made to love and to serve Him
in this world and enjoy Him forever in the next; that all this world's
wealth of field, of forest, of mine an4 of river has been bestowed
upon us by a kind Father, therefore I believe that wealth, as we know
it, originates from natural resources and from the labor which the
children of God expend upon these resources.

It is all ours except

for the harsh, cruel grasping w&3s of ricked men who first concentrated
wealth into the hands of a few, then dominated states, and finally
commenced to pit state egainst state in the frightful catastrophes
of commercial warfare.
Following this preamble, there shall be the principles of social
justice towards the realization of which we must strive:
l.

I believe in liberty of conscience and liberty of education,

not permitting the state to dictate either my worship to my God or
m:, chosen avocation in life.
2.

I believe that every citizen willing to work shall receive

a just, living, annual wage which will enable him both to maintain and
educate his family _according to the standards ·of American decency.
3.

I believe in nationalizing those public resources which by

their very nature are too important to be held in the control of
private individuals.

4.

I believe in private ownership of all other property.

5.

I believe in upholding the right to private property but in

controlling it for the public good.
6.

I believe in the abolition of the privately owned Federal

Reserve Banking system and the establishment of a Government owned
Central Bank.
?.

l believe in rescuing from the hands of private owners the

right to coin and regulate the value of money, which right mus_t be
restored to Congress where it belongs.
8.

I believe that one of the chief duties of this Government

owned Central Bank is to maintain the coat of living on an even keel
and arrange for the repayment of dollar debts with equal value dollars.
9.

I believe in the cost of production plus a fair profit for

the farmer.
10.

I believe not only in the right of the laboring man to

organize in unions but also in the duty of the Government, which that
laboring man supports, to protect these organizations against the
vested interests of wealth and of intellect.
11.

I believe in the recall of all non-productive bonds and

therefore in the alleviation of taxation.
12.

I believe in the abolition of tax exempt bonds.

13.

I believe in broadening the base of taxation according to

the principles of ownership and the capacity to pay.
14.

I believe in the simplification of government and the further

lifting of crushing taxation from the slender revenues of the laboring
.'

.. �.. , .

:

.

class.
15.

I believe that, in the event of a war for the defense of

our nation and its liberties, there shall be a conscription of wealth
as well as a conscription of men.
16.

I believe in preferring the sanctity of human rights to the

sanctity of property rights; for the chief concern of government
shall be for the poor because, as it is witnessed, the rich have
ample means of their own to care for themselves.
These are my beliefs.

These are the fundamentals of the

organization which I present to you under the name of the National
Union for Social Justice.

It is your privilege to reject or to

accept my beliefs; to follow me or to repudiate me.

Appendix II
THE PLATFORM OF THE UNIPN PARTY
l.

America shall be self-contained and self-sustained-no

foreign entanglements, be they political, economic, financial or military.
2.

Congress and Congress alone shall coin, _issue and regulate all

the money and credit in the United States through a central bank of
iBJUe.

J.

Immediately following the establishment of the central bank

of issue, Congress shall provide for the retirement of all tax-exempt,
interest-bemng bond& and certificatea of indebtedneas of the
Federal Government, and shall refinance all the present agricultural
mortgage indebtedness for the farmer and all the home mortgage
indebtedness for the city owner by the use of its money and credit
which it now gives to the oontrol of private bankers.
4.

Congress shall legislate that there will be an assurance of

a living annual wage for all laborers capable of working and willing to
work.
5.

Congress shall legislate that there will be an assurance of

production at a profit for the farmer.
6.

Congress shall legislate that there will be assurance of

reasonable and decent security for the aged, who, through no fault of
their own, have been victimized and exploited by an unjust economic
system which has so concentrated wealth in the hands of a few that it
has impoverished great masses of our people.

to the end that these small industries and enterprises mq not only
survive and prosper but that they may be multiplied.
13.

Congress shall protect private property from confiscation·

through unnecessary taxation with the understanding that the human
rights of the masses take precedence over the financial rights of
the classes.
14.

Congress shall set a limitation upon the net income of' any

individual in any one year and a limitation of the amount that such
an individual may receive as a gift or as an inheritance, which
limitation shall be executed through taxation.
15,

Congress shall re-establish conditions so that the youths of'

the nation as they emerge from schools and colleges, will have the
opportunity to earn a decent living while in the process of perfecting
themselves in a trade or profession.

APPENDIX III
THE UNION PARTY VOTE IN. 1936
Name on Balloi

State

Union
Union

Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa

Union
Union
Union
Union
Union
Union
Union Progressive
Union
Union
Write in
Union

Kansas

Kentuclcy
Louisiana

Union

Maine

)

Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey

Union
The Third Party
Union
Union
Union
Union
Union
National Union for
Social Justice
Union

New Mexico·
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina

Union
Union
Union
Independent Union
Royal Oak
Union

.,

Votes
551
3,3(1'7
9,962
21,805
442
1
136
7,678
89,439
19,407
29,687
494
12,501
7,581
118,639
75,795
74,296
14,630
5,539
12,847
4,819
9,405
924
2
36,708
132,212
21,831
67,467
19,569

State
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vennont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Name on Ballot

Votes

Independent
Union
Union
Union

10,338
296
3,177
1,121

Union
Union

223
17,463

Union
Union

60,297
1,653
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